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CONTRACT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
IN CORPORATE LAW
VICTOR BRUDNEY *
INTRODUCTION
The concept "fiduciary" in Anglo-American law has evolved to
embrace a wide range of relationships. From its origins in the law of
trusts it has been extended to the relationships between a variety of
professionals and their clients and further to the world of commerce.
In that world it has been invoked in agency, partnership, and corporate
relationships, and dubiously has often been said to be entailed in a
large number of other contractual relationships, such as banks with
borrowers or depositors, franchisors with franchisees, licensors with
licensees, and distributorships. The conditions that implicate the fidu-
ciary relationship are comparable, but not identical, across the range
of its coverage) The restraints on the fiduciary's self-benefiting behav-
*Weld Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Boston
College Law School. I am indebted kir insightful counsel to Lucian A. Bebchuk, David Charily
and Scott T. Fitzgibbon who, however, are not responsible for the views expressed in this Article.
1
 Apart from express trust, the fiduciary relationship and corresponding obligations arise
when a person either (I) employs the services of another to act on the former's behalf (generally
for specified compensation but no other reward) in matters in which the latter may be deemed
to have special knowledge or competence that the former lacks, and the latter is intended to have
substantial discretionary power over the subject matter of their dealings; or (2) places (or finds
placed) in the custody or control of another (who may be deemed to have special knowledge or
competence or integrity) property or interests to he preserved or enhanced in the custodian's
substantial and effectively tummuitorable discretion. Notwithstanding that the parties' relation-
ship may originate in contract or consent, the accompanying fiduciary obligations arc imposed
by the stale, even in the absence or consent to the relationship, or at least the absence of consent
to assume those obligations.
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for that attend the finding of the fiduciary relationship are not the
same in each category or indeed in all contexts within any category.
The same is true for the sanctions imposed for violating such fiduciary
obligations.
The variations are said to call for an explanation that relates and
justifies them by a coherent theory. Some offer such a theory by
rejecting or muting the fiduciary notion, and instead invoking a more
or less rigid model to which they attach the label "contract." 2 Others
see a less orderly world and offer more complex explanations that
reflect many more dimensions of reality and significantly different
values than does the simplistic model that the former massage. 3
Neither "contract" nor "fiduciary" exists in nature. Each is a con-
struct developed in legal discourse to serve normative as well as analytic
functions. The contractarians appear to suggest that "contract" and the
consequences that contract doctrine prescribes better "fit" or explain
all the transactions and arrangements that have been characterized as
"fiduciary" than does the construct "fiduciary" alone. Treating those
transactions and arrangements as embodiments of "contract" is con-
sidered analytically and normatively preferable to treating them as a
separate genus labeled "fiduciary." However, because the content of
each construct often varies with the context, the suggestions cannot be
Courts sometimes declare that a fiduciary relationship arises in the absence of a charge to
act solely on behalf of another, e.g. franchisor-franchisee, licensor-licensee, bank-lender-depositor.
The claim is questionable, even though it is driven by the accurate perception that one party is
given substantial discretion in the conduct of the arrangements and power and temptation to
appropriate for himself or herself' interests or property of the other.
2 See Frank 1-1. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 3611- & Ecosr.
425 (1993); see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L REV. 1 (1990); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); John H. Langbein, The Contraclarian Basis of
the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE U. 625 (1995).
3 See generally Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: E,fficieney, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); ErnestJ. Wein rib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO
L.J. 1 (1975). Some are concerned with the concept of "trust" as it informs a wide range of
relationships and transactions. See, e.g., J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1226-30 (1995) [hereinafter
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties]; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983) [hereinafter
Frankel, Fiduciary Law]; Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor;
Analogy and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 ILL. L. REV. 897, 907-11 (1996). Others focus on
the fiduciary relationship in the corporate context. See Kenneth B. Davis, Judicial Review of
Fiduciary Decision-Making: Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 [hereinafter
DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation]; Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Obligations Under Intellectual Siege:
Contemporary Challenges to the Duty to Be Loyal, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 471 (1992) [hereinafter
DeMott, Contemporary Challenges); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43
DUKE L.J. 425 (1993); see also Rutherford B. Campbell, jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the
Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 563-64 (1996).
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examined or evaluated without first identifying the particular context.
As with the fiduciary relationship, to say that a relationship is contrac-
tual "only begins analysis; it gives direction to further analysis ... What
obligations does [the contracting party] . . . owe? In what respect has
he failed to discharge those obligations? And what are the conse-
quences of his deviation from duty?".'
For such analysis it is of little moment whether the concept "fidu-
ciary" is a separate genus or is a species of the concept "contract," so
long as its distinctive history, content and normative aspirations are
understood and respected. If it is characterized as a species of contract,
appreciation of the extent to which its premises, prescriptions and
consequences differ from those of other species of contract is crucial.
Thus, the structure and aspirations of contract that most often inform
the suggestions of con tractarians—volitional and unbridled consent by
autonomous knowledgeable parties to arrangements whose aspiration
is wealth-maximization—do not appear the only vision of contract that
courts and commentators articulate. That particular vision embodies
perceptions and values about which there is disagreement as a matter
of contract doctrine. More importantly, as we shall see, their values
differ significantly from the values that the fiduciary notion embodies
historically and functionally. To cut through substance to form (i.e. to
characterize the fiduciary relationship and its traditional strictures as
a form of contract) and then to invoke the form as a fulcrum on which
to ratchet down the substantive restrictions uses the term "contract" as
an undistributed middle in a problematic syllogism.
The "law" of contract may be analyzed in terms of the parties
invoking the state's coercive power to enforce or "complete" their
private arrangements or of the state exercising its coercive power to
limit the extent to which the parties may engage in, or act under, their
private arrangements. In either case, the notion of contract as a private
arrangement rests upon the exercise of the state's power and the rules
it promulgates to enforce or limit the arrangement.' To characterize
the state-imposed limits as "default" rules or "background" rules sug-
gests that the parties are free to ignore, or decline to be bound by,
restrictions that society imposes to protect individuals, whether pater-
nalistically, or to avoid externalities, or otherwise. The suggestion is
that parties are as free to "contract" with one another as they would
be in a pre-state world with no such socially-imposed restrictions. That
basic structural assumption is problematic. Some of those background
Cf. SF,C v, Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1942).
5
 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 limtv. L. Rev. 561 (1933); Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Thrt Law, 41 MD. L. Rev. 563 (1982).
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rules are not permitted to be circumvented by the parties; others are.
Even in the latter case, the existence of state-imposed background rules
limits the parties' power to "contract around" them (in whole or in
part) or to treat their arrangements as if the rules did not exist.
Restrictions on actions by fiduciaries (or by tort-feasors) are state-
imposed, as are the limits on the power of the affected parties to alter
those restrictions. But both the content of those restrictions and the
power to alter them differ from the content and modifiability of the
restrictions that "mere" contract law imposes on non-fiduciary, non-tor-
dons, contracting parties. Contractarians' discussion of the notion of
contract generally rests on the assumption that the state, apart from
enforcing the terms of the contract, imposes only thinly textured
restrictions on the parties' behavior vis-a-vis one another before (and
in the course of performing) their contract. But fiduciaries start with
thick restrictions that substantially hamper their freedom to act with
respect to, or to alter their state-imposed obligations to, their beneficiar-
ies. The conditions that generate state-imposed fiduciary restrictions''
not only impel limits on the fiduciary's power, but they impel limits on
the beneficiary's power (both procedurally and substantively) to con-
sent to departure from those restrictions. Those limits are more rigor-
ous than the limits on the non-beneficiary's power to consent to de-
parture from the restrictions of "mere" contract doctrine.' To that
extent, at least, fiduciary restrictions are more compelling than "mere"
contract restrictions.
Discussion of corporate law by legal academics recurringly focuses
on the question whether restrictions on the behavior of management
(directors and executive officers) and controlling stockholders of in-
vestor-owned publicly held corporations in benefiting themselves from
dealing with the corporation, its assets or the holders of its common
stock are, or should be, derived from the notion of fiduciary relation-
ship or of contractual relationship simp/iciter. Those discussions impli-
cate the questions whether there is or should be any difference be-
tween the two notions in that context, and if so, whether the conditions
that generate the fiduciary relationship require restrictions on, and
consequences for, the parties in matters of loyalty that contract theory,
at least classic contract doctrine, would not require or permit."
6 See supra note 1 and infra notes 15. 41 & 82.
7 See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
The "fiduciary" construct may appropriately be contrasted with die "contract" construct
(meaning by the latter the more or less conventional visions of contract and the rules that govern
them) rather than be treated as a species of contract. The existence of the one does not preclude
the simultaneous existence of the oilier in any particular arrangement or transaction.
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To focus on loyalty or distributive matters is not to ignore mana-
gerial behavior that may appropriately be challenged for violation of
the other essential obligation of fiduciaries—the duty of care in serving
the beneficiary's interest.'' Conduct that may violate that obligation is
frequently also challengeable for violation of the duty of loyalty. 1 ° But
in the case of investor-owned publicly held corporations, the principal
normative concern for the law and lawyers over the years has been with
the loyalty aspect of management's (including directors') and control-
ling stockholders' fiduciary obligations." That emphasis on loyalty
reflects substantial doubt that the "care" obligation entails a useful
norm of behavior) 2
9 Legal conventions divide fiduciary (obligations into obligations of loyalty and obligations of
care. The latter require some level of attentiveness, some process for (and actual) acquisition or
possession of relevant information, some reasoned deliberation in performing services, arid
exercise of some conscious (but virtually unrestricted) judgment about acceptable levels of return
per unit. of risk or other measure of enhancing stockholder well-being.
The obligation of loyalty is to serve the interests of the beneficiary rather than those of the
fiduciary. In its most demanding form, it requires the fiduciary to serve solely the beneficiary's
interests and to refrain from any kind of behavior (in performing services or in dealing with the
beneficiary or the property in its control) from which the fiduciary may gaits in excess of specified
compensation—even if such behavior imposes no cost on the beneficiaries or, it uleed, if' the
fist hire to engage in such behavior causes a Ions to them.
I° See, eg., David Morris Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread In
Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. Rex. 184 (1979); Nat Stern, The Practicality of Outreach Statutes
Enforcing Directors' Duty of Care, 72 NEB. L. REv. 905, 936-42 (1993). Thus management's pursuit
of growth, at the possible cost of increased return per unit of risk, or search for the quiet life, or
less risky investments than those that diversified stockholders should rationally prefer, !nay entail
potential violation of the latter duty as well as the former.
II Notwithstanding occasional overlapping coverage of the same behavior by the two dirties,
the duty of loyalty does not subsume all the benefits to fiduciaries from violation of the duty of
care, in fair part because some of those benefits are too ephemeral to be identified and it is too
ctsstly to make them sanctionable. But that does not mean that diversion of the more visible or
tangible assets of the firm should not be assessed more critically for what it is—appropriation by
the fiduciary of the beneficiary's property—and be treated more severely than most violati ons of
the duty of care.
Economists tend to view the behavior addressed by the two duties as a continuum under the
rubric "agency costs" and to analyze them simply as a matter of contract or "incomplete contract."
That view marginalizes the difference between matters of care and matters of loyalty in human
behavior. But apart from the margin, analytically different considerations are involved in deline-
ating and normatively different consequences attend violation of the duties of care and loyalty.
By the same token, economists' view of contract generally leaves little or no room for fiduciary
notions—a view that also scants relevant differences in human behavior. Differences between the
visions of economists and lawyers in these matters have been noted in Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1153-57 (1976) and Avery Katz, Mar
Ter-tris or Mine! The Duty to Read the Fine Print In Contrails., 21 RAND J. or ECON. 518, 520-22
(1990). Compare Oliver E. Williamson, Calcuktiveness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 3611_
EcoN, 453 (1993), with Bruce Chapman, 'frost, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary
Obligation, 43 U. Toltotsrro U. 547 (1993).
12 The level of care required by the fiduciary standard is low, and the quality of judgment
required is even lower. The goad to induce managerial behavior to maximize stockholder wealth
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Exploration of questions of loyalty implicates another question
that is also currently discussed in corporate law: whether management
or controlling stockholders have, or should have, fiduciary obligations
of loyalty, rather than only contractual obligations, to investors in
straight senior securities (like straight preferred stock or bonds or
debentures), hybrid securities (such as convertibles, options, non-vot-
ing or differentially voting common stock) or the burgeoning phenom-
ena known as derivatives) This article compares the doctrinal and
functional bases of the loyalty obligations of management and control-
lers of public corporations to public holders of common stock, with
the functional and appropriate doctrinal obligations of common stock
(and the management it selects) to senior securities.
Part I examines the classic fiduciary doctrine of loyalty (the con-
ditions that underpin the traditional fiduciary relationship and the
categorical obligations to refrain from self-aggrandizing behavior that
the state imposes upon the fiduciary) and its predicate—the exclusive
benefit principle. It then discusses the abandonment of that predicate
and the doctrinal dilution of those obligations in the cases of corporate
management and controlling (common) stockholders. Notwithstand-
ing the magnitude of the dilution, however, corporate law continues
to characterize the relationship and its obligations as fiduciary.
Part II compares the conditions, normative assumptions, and con-
tent of traditional fiduciary loyalty analysis with those of traditional
contract doctrine. It also compares the restraints imposed by contract
is virtually non-existent; the incentive of reward, rather than the sanction of punishment, is the
preferred stimulus to agents' efforts. Moreover, courts have limited competence in such matters
and great reluctance to examine claims of violation of the obligation of care. And more recently,
legislatures have provided or authorized exculpation from monetary damage for violation of the
duty of care. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (Supp. 1996); N.Y. Bus. Coal , . 1,Aw
402(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); REVISED Monet. Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(h) (4) (1994).
Except for directors of financial institutions, claims for such violations have rarely been invoked
successfully in the courts. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 65-96
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995); Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968). Behavior that the
duly of care is designed to control, therefore, does not entail the conduct that is the principal
concern of economists or organization theorists—optimizing performance and maximizing
wealth. The duty of care addresses only the minimum level of required performance by an agent.
To be sure, if violation of that duty occurs, it may be of significantly larger economic interest to
society and investors than much of the conduct at which the duty of loyalty is aimed. But matters
of loyalty are generally of substantial consequence, particularly as they are said to have spill-over
effects on optimal managerial behavior.
13
 This article is not concerned with the larger problems of corporate governance that are
raised by the "new wave" of scholarship that sees the corporation as a socio-economic unit with
a variety of contributors, participants and claimants—such as employees, suppliers, consumers,
the community, etc.—and addresses the problems of management's obligations to each of those
stakeholders. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995); Sym-
posium, Corporate Malaise—Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. Rev. 1 (1991);
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doctrine on managerial or controllers' self-aggrandizing behavior with
the restrictions imposed both by traditional fiduciary obligations and
by diluted corporate fiduciary obligations. Part II includes in its exami-
nation of contract doctrine not only those restraints against opportun-
istic behavior imposed by lean classic doctrine, but also those restraints
that would be imposed by richer notions developed in contract doc-
trine—e.g., the concepts of duress, adhesion and the evolving concepts
of unconscionability and good faith. Finally, Part II examines the par-
ticular concept of contract urged by contractarians as the summum
bonum and the differences between its normative aspirations and those
of fiduciary loyalty doctrine—even as that doctrine is thinned in the
corporate context.
Part III argues that the restrictions on self-aggrandizing behavior
that are grounded in fiduciary loyalty doctrine, whether classic or
corporate, are inappropriate both analytically and normatively in re-
straining the behavior of common stock holders (and the management
that they elect) vis-a-vis holders of senior securities. But dispersed
senior investors are in need of limits on opportunistic behavior by
common stock holders to whom they necessarily give ambiguous con-
sent and considerable discretion in decision-making for the enterprise.
Part III suggests a contract-based approach that might appropriately
protect the public senior security holder against opportunistic behav-
ior by common stock holders without unduly limiting the latter's dis-
cretion to optimize performance and maximize values.
I. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND
CONTROLLERS To HOLDERS OF COMMON STOCK
A. Background
I. Trusts and Agency
From its origins in the law of trusts and its invocation in agency
relationships, the fiduciary obligation of loyalty has entailed the exclu-
sive benefit principle and a kind of prophylactic prohibition on self=
dealing. The notion is that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty requires the
trustee or agent to act as the beneficiary's (or principal's) alter ego
and act only as the latter would act for himself. At least as between the
fiduciary's interest and the beneficiary's interest the fiduciary is to
serve only the latter. 14
 To assure such exclusive service, the fiduciary is
Symposium, The Corporate Stakeholder Conference, 43 U. TORONTO U. 297 (1993); Symposium,
New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).
14 See supra note 1.
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to refrain from engaging in any transaction with the trust's or princi-
pal's assets, or the beneficiary or principal, from which he might either
gain for himself or harm the beneficiary.'' To be sure, the trustee does
not function as an altruist who foregoes all concern with advancing
self-interest. With rare exceptions the fiduciary expects, and receives,
compensation for performing his or her function. That compensation
is provided by the express terms of the arrangement, or by the courts
in the absence of such a provision. But apart from such compensation,
the exclusive benefit principle precludes rewards to the fiduciary.
While the prophylactic component of the principle may not be
implemented uniformly, the theme of exclusive benefit informs the
trustee's and agent's obligations. The strictures thus evolved by courts
of equity are normally enforced by sanctions that, consonant with the
exclusive benefit principle and the reasons for prescribing such rigor-
ous restraints, are designed to deter those fiduciaries from even ap-
proaching the borders of self-aggrandizing behavior. 16 These strictures
The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the fiduciary agrees to act as his
principal's alter ego rather than to assume the standard arm's length stance of
traders in a market. Hence the fiduciary is not armed with the usual wariness that
one has in dealing with strangers; he trusts the principal to deal with him as frankly
as he would deal with himself—he has bought candor.
United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Original Great Am. Chocolate
Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992); Jordan v. Duff
& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987); Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 253
(Ct. App. 1990); el Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 131-32 (7th
Cir. 1996) (discussing permissibility of seeking and retaining personal advantage under contract
law).
Trustees may have fiduciary duties to conflicting claimants (e.g., life tenants and remainder-
men) but they arc not themselves such claimants. Whatever may be the specifications by the
senior or other criteria that should determine how the trustee should resolve such conflicts
between persons other than the trustee, the exclusive benefit principle is not involved in—and
does not preclude the trustee from effecting—resolution of conflict between parties neither of
whom appointed him as its sole agent. It simply precludes the trustee from obtaining any benefit
for itself from the resolution of those conflicts.
15 See Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726); see also Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267,
271 (1951); Estate of Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488, 490 (Ill. 1985); Matter of Gleeson's Will, 124
N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955); 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRA'rCIIER, THE LAIN OF TRUSTS § 170 (4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170
and cults. b & j (1959). The same considerations that disable the parties from proscribing
specified conduct in advance impel prophylactic prohibitions that substitute for the impossible
task of parsing the extent of permissible gains to the errant fiduciary in any particular case. See,
e.g., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994); Thorpe v. Cerbco,
Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1995); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1045 (1991). That
the judiciary occasionally recognizes a fiduciary's compensable contribution in the context of a
prohibited self-serving transaction, see Boardman v. Phipps, 2 App. Cas. 46 (H.L. 1967), does not
detract from this conclusion.
"See supra not 15.
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contemplate not merely compensating beneficiaries for losses, but forcing
disgorgement of the fiduciary's gains even when the beneficiary is not
shown to have been harmed. They include tracing by way of imposing
a constructive trust or by awarding to the beneficiary increments to
those gains; and they implicate punitive sanctions such as denying the
trustee or agent any compensation.''
The exclusive benefit principle and its prophylactic implementa-
tion impose the costs of over-prohibition on the beneficiary, the fiduciary
and society. Transactions that might. he beneficial to all may be re-
quired to be foregone in order to ensure that the beneficiary receives
the full benefits of the fiduciary's services. Presumably, a regime of
over-prohibition obtains in the trust and the agency contexts because
the power and magnitude of the fiduciary's temptations to benefit
himself at the possible expense of the beneficiary are coupled with
insurmountable problems in inducing him to resist that temptation.
Those problems stem largely from difficulties in specifying and moni-
toring (and the cost of litigating over compliance with) terms that
would permit self-aggrandizing transactions only if they were value-in-
creasing and the beneficiary was benefited or not harmed by them.'s
The damper on the fiduciary's incentives that a prophylactic rule
creates may impose additional costs.'" On the other hand, a regime
of under-prohibition may result in higher cost to beneficiaries and
17 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle
in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE' L.J. 1339, 1354-60 (1985); see also Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d
801, 802-03 (Minn. 1952) (agency); Rothko v. Reis, 372 N.E.2d '101, 297-99 (N.Y. 1977) (punitive
damages); Equity Corp. v. Groves, 60 N.E.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. 1945) (corporate management); Wendt
v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (principal-agent); Docker v. Scnes, 39 Eng. Rep. 1095,
1098 (Ch. 1834) (express trust). While there is argument over how harsh the permissible penalties
may be, seeSccirr & Fiticrcunt, supra note 15, at 320-23; Richard V. Welhuan, Punitive Surcharges
Against Disloyal Fiduciaries—Is Rothko Right?, 77 Mua I. L. REv. 95 (1978), there is no doubt of
the disgorgement and constructive trust requirements and deterrent aims of the sanctions. See,
e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510, 515-16 (1980) (agent); Musser v. Darrow, 341 U.S.
267 (1950) (bankruptcy trustee); Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, 656-57 (2d Cir. 1948) (corporate
directors); Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d at 491; REsTATEmEN• (SmoNn) of , Tausis §§ 202-206 and ants.
(1959); GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.11 (1978 & Stipp. 1996); Weinrib, supra
note 3, at 19.
18 See Davis, supra note 3, at 53-59; see also infra note 50.
19 Quite apart from whether the cost of value-increasing transactions lust by the prophylactic
rule exceeds the cost of unprofitable value-decreasing transactions' averted by that rule is the
possible cost of the rule on the fiduciary's incentives. See infra text accompanying notes 49-54.
The fiduciary's willingness to act solely on the beneficiary's behalf' is not au act of selflessness or
altruism. Generally the fiduciary is compensated for accepting the role, and that compensation
is assumed to he sufficient so that no other benefits (such as may be obtained by self-dealing)
are needed to induce performance of duties. Hence, at least at the outset of the relationship, the
exclusive benefit principle need not deprive the fiduciary (trustee or agent) of the requisite
incentive. But see infra note 28.
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possibly society than would invoking the exclusive benefit principle.
Whether—and how significantly—an under-prohibition regime would
or would not increase costs are empirical questions.'"
In any event, evaluating the fiduciary obligation of loyalty on the
premises of net cost savings in a regime dedicated to wealth-maximi-
zation is not the only approach to assessing the rules that implement
fiduciary obligations. Values other than wealth-maximization are also
served by the vision of human interaction underlying the fiduciary
notion of loyalty, whether they entail the concept of "trust" with its
moral underpinning and richer, more complex view of humans and
their societal relationships,"' or the more modest notion of non-pecu-
niary relief from personal worry over possible self-appropriating be-
havior by the trustee or agent. Non-pecuniary benefits of that sort may
be viewed as implications of richer normative values than monetary
wealth-maximization. Or they may be deemed to constitute a second-
order offset (in a broad calculation of "interest" or "utilities") to any
short-fall from monetary wealth-maximization in a rational wealth-
maximizing world. In short, the fiduciary relationship and its obliga-
tions serve functions not addressed by "mere" contract in a world that
puts a premium on individual autonomy, let alone in a cooperating
world that takes a broader view of the psychological and social needs
and functions of human beings.
20 Even without serious empirical inquiry, the tension between the costs and benefits of
over-inclusion and under-inclusion may be addressed by relaxing the categorical prohibition and
pro tanlo diminishing the beneficiary's protection and substituting a more or less comprehensive
regime of regulation of the trustee's behavior. See generally Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1105 (1988);
Langbein, supra note 2; Laurence B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties Under EI?.ISA: A Tale of Multiple
Loyalties, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 43 (1994). The role of the indenture trustee might have been
fiduciary at one time, but it no longer is. See, e.g., 15 U.S.0 § 77ouo (1994); S. REP. No. 101-55,
at 29-35 (1989); John P. Campbell & Robert 'Lack, Put A Bullet in The Poor Beast. His Leg is
Broken and His Use Is Past, 32 Bus. L. 1705 (1977). See also infra note 27.
Whether that relaxation and concomitant regulation adequately protect beneficiaries, and
the extent to which those changes are driven by the demands of efficiency rather than by the
raw political power of the trustee, are questions for further analysis and debate. For example, as
trustees' functions evolve historically to manage liquid assets rather than real property, to what
extent does the relaxation of the exclusive benefit principle reflect different requirements of
efficiency in managing the one rather than the other, or different allocations of political power
between settlers and beneficiaries on the one side and fiduciaries on the other?
21 See, e.g., TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (D. Gambetta ed. 1988)
(particularly, P. Dasgupta, Trust As a Commodity, at 49, and D. Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust, at
213). See also Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE or BUSINESS 55, 75-76 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985);
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 3, at 1226-30; I.M. Jackman, Restitution for Wrongs, 48
GoaktamuuE Lj. 302 (1989); G. Richmond Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of
Commercial Contracts: 'Award a New Cause of Action, 44 Vim). L. Rev. 221, 258-64 (1991). But
see Hardin, Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions, in STRATEGY AND CtuncE, 185 (Zeckhauser ed.
1993); 'Williamson, .supra note 11.
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The costs of the exclusive benefit principle are lessened by relax-
ing the prophylactic requirement and accepting rules providing that
some specified self-aggrandizing transactions by the fiduciary are per-
mitted if the beneficiary or principal freely gives informed, express
consent to them, or a court or legislature authorizes them, 22 It is the
power thus to authorize (or consent to) departure from the exclusive
benefit principle (coupled with the initial consent to enter into the
relationship) that is said to establish that the fiduciary relationship is
simply a species of contract. It is not necessary to insist that the
fiduciary relationship is a separate genus, rather than a species of
contract, in order to recognize that it is different from any other
species of contract, and that it embodies significantly different pre-
scriptions for the parties' behavior. Valid consent by a beneficiary
requires meeting considerably more rigorous conditions than does
comparable consent by parties to contracts (or other species of con-
tract)—reflecting the considerable differences between the autonomy
of the parties in, and the functions of, the relationships.
Thus the considerations that generate the exclusive benefit prin-
ciple (if not its prophylactic implementation) require limiting the
kinds of transactions in which a beneficiary can validly waive it. They
require the fiduciary to take steps to alter effectively the atmosphere
of obligation or reliance, so that the beneficiary and the fiduciary can
deal freed from the shadow of the trustee's status and the beneficiary's
dependence. 23 Hence the trustee is obliged to disclose ftilly all the
information relevant to the transactions, including the gain to the
trustee, and possible disadvantages to the beneficiary. Moreover, be-
cause the prior status or dependence and the beneficiary's resulting
non-wariness cannot be completely eliminated, fiduciary doctrine im-
poses an overriding restriction of fairness in order for the consent to
be valid. To describe the state-imposed limitations on a trustee's self-
serving behavior as default rules that can be waived is not to make
them the same (in content or in waivability) as default rules that can
be waived for "mere" contract engagement."
The exclusive benefit principle may be more costly for the rela-
tionship between agents and commercial principals, in which the aspi-
22 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170 cmt. w, 216, 222 (1959). That a senior
may empower a trustee to self deal, see, e.g., Dutton v. Wainer, 52 N.Y. 312 (1873), does not relieve
the trustee of either procedural requirements or substantive limitations otherwise imposed by
fiduciary obligations. See RESTATEMENT (SecoND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. t; Scorr & Fitxrcum,
supra note 15, at § 170.9; see also Davis, supra note 3, at 44-46 & n.128.
23 See RESTATEMENT (SvcoNn) OF TRUSTS §§ I 70, min. w, 222, 216; Scorr & FRATctiElt, supra
note 15, at § 170.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ADENOY §§ 387, 390 & cult. a (1959); see also infra
notes 79-81.
24 1...angbein appears to make such a claim. See L.:night:in, supra note 2, at 650-67. The
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ration may be more to maximize than to preserve values. 25 Moreover,
the exclusive benefit principle may be less necessary. Commercial
principals have more power, and generally more ability, than trust
beneficiaries to specify strictures and to consent to alterations in them,
as well as to supervise and terminate the agents' activities. But the
benefits of specialization dictate relieving the principal of the difficul-
ties of the first. and the cost of the last two. The prophylactic prohibi-
tion avoids those difficulties and costs, along with the cost of litigating
compliance with inevitably inadequate specifications. The wealth-in-
creasing objective of the relationship may be tempered by the duty to
serve solely the interests of the principal because the resulting restric-
tions on the agent's behavior cast a shadow over maximizing activities
in transactions that implicate self-dealing. The extent, if any, to which
that shadow hinders monetary wealth-maximization is open to de-
bate. 26
 But even if it does, as with trusts do in the principal-agent
relationship, the fiduciary notion focuses on encouraging trust and on
cognate distributive aspirations, if necessary, at the expense of purely
wealth-maximizing aspirations.
The conflicting pulls of these considerations doubtless account for
the co-existence of the exclusive benefit principle and deterrent sanc-
tions in the commercial agency relationship 27
 and the principal's power
to consent to departure from them. That power is more plausible
in the case of a commercial principal than in the case of a trust
beneficiary. 2' But like a trust beneficiary's power to consent, it is lim-
differences between the fiduciary and contract concepts and rules and their waivability in the
corporate context are discussed infra notes 79-102 and accompanying text. The Restatement
(Second) of Trusts and Scott and Fratcher characterize a trust relationship as different from it
contract relationship and point to attributes that seem to differentiate the two, See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THUM'S §§ 170 cmt. w, 216, 222; see also Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 3, at
1215-30.
25
 1 n that context, the costs of the exclusive benefit principle and the interdiction of self-serv-
ing transactions may result in over-inclusive strictures that exceed the costs of under-inclusive
strictures by a greater margin than in the context of trusts. The commercial agent must be vested
with discretion to take risks that would be inappropriate if the goal were merely to preserve assets.
Prophylactically forbidding transactions implicates the loss of higher level risk, and therefore
presumably higher level profit, transactions. But the exclusive benefit principle is nevertheless
the governing norm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENcy §§ 387, 389 & cmt. c, 390 (1959).
a, See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
27 See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802-05 (Minn. 1952); Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E.
303, 304-05 (N.Y. 1926); REsTATEstENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-396, 407 (1959); rf Scallen,
supra note 3.
As comprehensive regulatory supervision is imposed to govern the relationship of principal
and agent—as in the case of stockbrokers or investment advisors—the demands of the exclusive
benefit rule may be relaxed. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(E), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb (1994); 17 C.F.R 240.15c1-8, 240.15c2-6 (1997) (e.g., front-running, mark-up policy, etc.).
28 The commercial agent may decline to serve unless rewarded with a return from the
product produced by the services. To permit an agent's reward to depend, in whole or in part,
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ited in scope and subject to restrictive conditions, albeit possibly less
so. 2" Hence, neither the existence of the power to consent nor its
exercise makes circumvention of the exclusive benefit principle the
norm or transmutes fiduciary relationships (and obligations) into sim-
ple contractual ones." Even if fiduciary strictures can be waived, their
existence and the limitations on their waivability offer protection to
principals and beneficiaries against the kinds of disadvantageous risk—
return allocations or reallocations to which parties to "mere" contract
are exposed.
2. Partnership
The fiduciary rules that govern restrictions on partners in the
partnership relationship respond to different conditions than those
upon the result of the services rendered effectively entitles the agent to share in the assets or
pints as would a partner or controlling stockholder, and it is likely to set up conflicts of interest
and incur social costs. See RESTAti (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138 & cnit. c (1959). The cost.
to the agent of performing services that linty produce benefits liar the principal and for society
may at sonic point in the process exceed the benefit to it of any increase in compensation (i.e.,
in the present value of the uncertain expected value of the product) that depends upon the
agent's continued effort. Contingent fees to lawyers—whether in personal injury actions for
individuals or in class actions generally—illustrate this possibility. Thus, allowing the agent. an
interest in the result of his service should be, and is, pro tango, a rejection by the principal of the
prophylactic prohibition and consent to relaxation of the exclusive benefit principle. h is conch-
!lotted upon (I) either free and inlOrtned Consent to such 'compensation" by a principal or by
visible institutional needs of a dispersed constituency for the particular services on the particular
terms—e.g., a lawyer's contingent ice—arid (2) in the latter c:ase by close judicial supervision of
the resulting compensation. See generally Mark 1'. Gergen, Th.e Use of Mims in Contract, 92 Co rust.
L. REv. 997 (1992).
20 1n the commercial agency context, such consent is likely to be given by a knowledgeable
actor able to make a comprehending decision. But the principal's decision is clouded by the
inevitable information disadvantage dint must be offset by adequate disclosure, and it is tram-
meled by the restraints affecting attempted modifications of any arrangements negotiated in
ntedias. See generally Varouj A. Aivasian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain
Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L tf, 173 (1984).
There may be fewer problems to empowering a principal, who is likely to be knowledgeable
than empowering a trust beneficiary who is not, to consent in advance to specified kinds of
mansacii4ms. As in trusts, to validate the principal's consent, the agent must make adequate
diselosum the principal must he able to act freely and the transaction must be "rain- See, e.g.,
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Clteng, 901 F.2d 1124, [128 (D.C. Cir, 1990); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 392 (1959). Moreover the agent remains subject to deterrent
sanctions that are not present in simple contract relationships. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
01,
 AGENCY §§ 399107 (1959); see also Gelfand v. Horizon Corp., (175 F.2d 1108, 1111–I3 (10th
Cir. 1982); Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d, 801 803-05 (Minn. 1952); Andrews v. Ramsay & Co.,
2 K.B. 635 (1903); Davis, supra note 3, at 99 n.130; Graham Douthwanc, Profits and Their Recovery,
15 Vita,. L. REV. 346 (1970).
m'Tlre exclusive benefit principle governs, but its itnpact is tempered when the self-dealing
takes the finin of the agent's use of the principal's property rather than the titan of an exchange
transaction] or a secret profit, because the issue is cast in terms 1)1 whose "property" is the agent
using—as in Sun Dial Corp. Rid.a, 108 A.2d 442 (NJ. 1954), or Reading v. Attorney
-General,
1 All E.R. 617 (HI. 1951).
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generating obligations of trustees or of many, perhaps most, commer-
cial agents. The exclusive benefit principle, with its prophylactic con-
comitant, addresses many kinds of appropriative behavior by a partner,
such as personally selling goods to, or buying them from, the firm or
taking a partnership opportunity for himself, without the fully in-
formed consent of the other partners. 31 But partners, unlike trustees
or agents generally (who are likely to have specified fixed compensa-
tion arrangements but little or no personal interest in the assets in-
volved), look for the bulk of their return from the relationship to the
increase in the value of partnership assets in which they share owner-
ship and revenues from operating those assets. 32
That process of sharing affects the operation of the strictures of
the exclusive benefit principle and its prophylactic prohibition in self-
aggrandizing transactions. Because those principles prohibit the fidu-
ciary from serving or benefiting himself separately in dealing with the
beneficiary's assets, they require return to the principal or beneficiary of
all gain and payment of all damage from self-dealing. But in the case
of a partner, the beneficiary or the principal is the partnership. Be-
cause the errant partner is entitled to share in partnership assets," the
sanction for the self-dealing transaction does not deprive him of his
pro-rata or contractual share of the gains or damages returned to the
partnership. Nevertheless he is not entitled to pursue his own self-in-
31 Current partnership doctrine is anchored in the common law as specifically altered by the
UPA. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act §§ 4, 5 (1914), 6 U.L.A. '250, 254 (1995); see also Page v.
Page, 359 13.2d 41 (Cal. 1961). Partners (at least active partners) generally can specify and monitor
the fiduciary's (i.e., other partner's) behavior more readily than can the beneficiary of a trust or
a commercial principal. But the cost of being required to specify or monitor the behavior of each
partner across a broad spectrum of conduct over the expected duration of a business partnership
suggests that efficiency as well as equity requires protection for each party against the other that
is comparable to that required against agents. The exclusive benefit principle informs that
protection, as is evident from cases requiring the partner to return the proceeds from all
self-dealing to the partnership. See, e.g., U.P.A. § 21; see also •Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205,
1210 (Ariz.. Ct. App. 1985); Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1982); Birnbaum v.
Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.2d 545, 547 (N.Y.
1928); ALAN K. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIRSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIISSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 6.07 (1996). The indeterminacy of the scope of possible misbehavior that underpins the
prophylactic prohibition is addressed insofar as the remedy requires return of allbenelits received
in all such transactions to the partnership.
32 Those returns to partners are likely to be provided quite apart from any compensation
fixed in their agreement. As Story pointed out long ago, ordinary agents differ from partner
agents because the latter have "a community of interest with the other partners in the whole
property and business and responsibilities of the partnership; whereas an agent, as such, has no
interest in either." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP I (photo. reprint
1980) (1841),
"Although Inc common law and the statutes provide for equal sharing, see U.P.A. § 18(a);
U.P.A. § 401 (b) (1994), 6 U.L.A. 51 (1995), they also contemplate contractual variations in
sharing--a contemplation that is often fulfilled.
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terest apart from the partnership's interest—i.e., except as his self-in-
terest is embodied in his entitlement to share in the partnership's
interest, or within the limited circumstances in which the other part-
ners may validly consent. 34
 In short, the sharing obligation does not
entail departure from the exclusive benefit principle, although it does
often require departure from the prophylactic prohibition.
Deterrent sanctions like constructive trusts, that are the hallmark
of fiduciary obligations, may be invoked to restrain a partner from
misappropriating partnership assets. But to the extent that a partner's
accountability permits sharing (in accordance with the distributive
terms of the partnership agreement) the misappropriated gains that
are returned to the partnership, deterrent sanctions are diluted and
fiduciary restrictions may, pro tanto, be deemed to be loosened. 35
That loosening may be said to be a move in the direction of
contract obligation and away from the fiduciary obligations associated
with trustees and agents. The revisions proposed in the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act contemplate further substantial loosening. But
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act is authoritatively said not to
assimilate such diluted partnership obligations to "mere" contract,
even as it erodes fiduciary obligations. 36
 Nor does the limited power of
34 See U.P,A. § 21(I) ( 1914), 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995). But see BRommue, & RI BSTEIN, supra note
31, at § 6,07(h); Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L.
425, 456-63 (1987).
35 See Prince v. Harting, 2 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (1960); Liggett v. Lester, 390 P.2d 351, 355 (Or.
1964); BROMBERG & RI BSTEIN, supra note 31, at § 6.07(i); Leona Beane, The Fiduciary Relation-
ship of a Partner, 5 J. Cum , . L. 483, 502 n.141 (1980). But if a partner's behavior is "sufficiently
egregious," punitive damages that do not entail sharing may be imposed. See BROMBERG &
RHISTEIN, supra note 31, § 6.07.
The loosening of restrictions may account ii the admonitory piety of the courts in discussing
partners' fiduciary obligations. See J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Share-
holders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WARE FOREST L. REV. 9, 11 (1987).
31 ' The Revised Uniform Partnership Act focuses on the extent to which fiduciary obligations
should be diluted or curtailed, and in any emu should be waivable, but there is reluctance to
permit them to be wholly eliminated by the parties. See U.P.A. §§ 103(143-5, 404 & cans (1994),
6 U.L.A. 16, 58 (1995). Compare Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 73 B.U. L. lbw. 523, 556-63 (1993) [hereinafter Vestal, Contractarian
Errork and Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act,
46 Bus. Law. 427, 460-61 (1991), and Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. Litv... 1, 26-28 (1993), with Larry E. Ribstein,
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 57-61 (1993).
The elimination of all reference to "fiduciary" in the text, the content of § 404(e) and the
standard of "good faith and fair dealing" in § 404(d) go a long way toward m aking the partnership
relationship one or simple contract. See U.P.A. § 404(2). Compare Weidner & Lawson, supra, at
18-20, 23-28, with Ribsteiti, supra, at 52-61. But the authors of the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act insist they have not gone all the way. See Weidner & Larson, supra. But cf. Claire Moore
Dickerson, Is it Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts .: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. Cow. L. Rim 111 (1993); Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure Obligations
of Partners Inter Se Under the. Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994: Is the Contractarian
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partners to consent to particular departures from the looser fiduciary
obligations, upon adequate disclosure of the import of such consent, 57
imply (or offer reason for) substitution of simply contractual restric-
tions on partners' self-serving behavior in the absence of such consent.
B. Management's and Controllers' Fiduciary Obligations to
Stockholders of Public Corporations"
I. Management"
When the fiduciary notion is examined in the context of the
relationship of management of a public investor-owned corporation to
Revolution Failing?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1559, 1564 (1995) [hereinafter Vestal, Disclosure
Obligations]. In view of the feasibility of obtaining the partners' meaningful consent to particular
Transactions, the insistence on eviscerating "background" fiduciary obligations is puzzling.
37 There is considerable current debate on whether partners should be able to, or under
existing law may, contract wholly or even substantially out of fiduciary obligations, see supra note
36; see also, BROMBERG & RtusrEnst, supra note 31, §§ 6.01(c), 6.07(h), even though they may on
occasion be permitted to grant broad waivers. See generally Daniel S. Reynolds, Loyalty and the
Limited Partnership, 34 KAN. L. Rim 1 (1985) (discussing limited partnerships). See aLso ALFRED
F. CONAR q ET AL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 355-57 (4th ed. 1987) (illustrating one possibility
that may or may not be valid). Permissible waivers arc limited in scope, see Vestal, Contractarian
Error, supra note 36, at 530 n.19. Like all forms of such consent (as in the cases of trust
beneficiaries and commercial principals) these waivers are conditioned on meeting requirements
of disclosure and volition. At common law and wider the UPA, and to a lesser extent under the
RUI'A, such requirements are likely to be more demanding than under contract or tort doctrine.
See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 6.06; Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to
Remain Silent?: Duties 4 Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. CORP. L. 65 (1994)
[hereinafter DeMott, Duties of Disclosure]; Vestal, Disclosure Obligations, supra note 36, at 1603-09,
1612.
3H The posture of stockholder managers of typical close corporations vis-a-vis other stockhold-
ers is more like that of partners than managers of publicly held corporations. To be sure, the
background legal characteristics of close corporations differ from those of partnerships—e.g.,
with respect to terminability and division of assets, participation in decision-making, liability of
partners, and even transferability of participation. Increasing the extent of those differences by
"contract" does not make the exclusive benefit principle and its prophylactic implemention less
essential for close corporations than for partnerships. However, the ability freely and knowledge-
ably to alter those "fiduciary" obligations, which is greater for participants in close than in public
corporations (although possibly less than for partners), may well be of more significance for
participants of close corporations than of public corporations. Analysis of the interplay between
the exclusive benefit principle and the power to waive it in the case of the close corporation
entails somewhat different doctrinal and normative questions than are entailed in either typical
private partnerships or public corporations. See, e.g., Nagy v. Riblet Prod. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577
(7th Cit. 1996), certifying questions to 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996). As the "corporate" law learning
infects the relationships among stockholders in close corporations, the equal sharing required
of partners is transmuted into a requirement of "fairness" which is explicitly understood not
necessarily to entail equal sharing. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376-77 (Del,
1993) (en bane). Compare Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975),
with Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 855 (Mass. 1988), and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
"The concept "management" sometimes refers to the Board of Directors [hereinafter
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the enterprise and the holders of its common stock, a still different
configuration of interests and needs must be addressed. Management's
fiduciary obligations of loyalty, although perhaps not formally attribut-
able to the agency concept, are substantially the same as those of
agents. 4° Those duties are sometimes said to run to the corporation,
sometimes to the stockholders (generally the common stockholders)
and sometimes to both."t In any event, management's duty of loyalty
requires the same self-denying behavior on its part, whether its duty is
owed to the corporation or to the common stockholders. Traditional
fiduciary loyalty obligations would forbid management from benefiting
"board"l (generally elected by the stockholders), sometimes to the officers (generally appointed
by the board) and sometimes to both. For purposes of this paper it is unnecessary to distinguish
between the board and the officers, notwithstanding that (a) board members function only
episodically and receive modest compensation in comparison with executive officers, and (b)
some board members may not be engaged in transactions that violate the exclusive benefit
principle, or indeed that those members may "consent" (on behalf of "the corporation" or the
stockholders) to such transactions. The term "management" will refer to both in discussing
conduct that implicates their duty of loyalty.
4
 A more or less formal problem is generated by the ambiguous roles of the board and the
officers since they are undoubtedly viewed as agents of "the corporation" for purposes of relating
"the corporation" to third persons. Neither is 'initially an agent of the inert fictitious principal
which cannot possibly "control" them. On the contrary, in their respective roles, each controls
the principal. Nor is either formally an agent of the stockholders, who are powerless to control
their conduct in operating the business. But, if the demands of centralized management. thus
restrict stockholder power, nothing in those demands alters the obligations of officers and
directors to act will) the can: in managing the business that attaches to agents acting on behalf
of the stockholders who selected the board and, indirectly, the officers. More importantly, nothing
in those demands requires altering the obligations of loyalty, including the exclusive benefit
principle, that attaches to agents and trustees. Nor is there any divergence between the legitimate
interests of the stockholders and those of the abstraction denominated "corporation" in manage-
ment's loyalty, notwithstanding divergences and conflicts of interest among "the corporation's"
investors in the matter of maximizing or indeed preserving the value of the collective assets, See
infra Part H.
41
 The interests of the corporation as a fictitious entity inevitably cimvert into the interests
of the constituents or participants in the enterprise that is conducted in the form of the
corporation. As a matter of social and economic policy, there is room to argue about the allocation
of entitlements and obligations among those participants or "stakeholders," and doctrinally,
comparable questions arise by reason of their contractual arrangements. See supra note 13;
Chapman, supra note 11. But, by definition, fiduciary loyalty obligations that entail the exclusive
benefit principle ibr one set of claimants cannot run from management to each of the conflicting
claimants. There are sound, if' debatable, economic reasons for the corporate structure to
empower common stockholders (both because they only take residual risks and because of their
inability adequately to specify or monitor threats to their residual interest), rather than any of
the other constituencies, to vote for management (i.e., the decision makers). See Jonathan R.
Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. Rev. 23 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate
Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 179-88; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403-06 (1983). Those reasons and the accompanying
structure imply that management's agency or fiduciary obligations should run to stockholders
rather than to the others. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
612	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:595
itself (except for specified compensation) in dealing with corporate
assets, the corporation or the stockholders, and require it to direct its
energies to benefiting solely the corporation and pro tanto the stock-
holders.
The public stockholder, like the commercial principal and the
partner, seeks increase in the value of his or her investment. The
virtues of centralized management in effecting that goal preclude both
officers and directors from being subject to the daily control of stock-
holders, as a commercial agent in such matters might be. Moreover,
the wealth-enhancing function of management implicates taking risks
with the assets that are not permitted to a trustee. But neither the
reasons for centralized management nor for the risk-taking function
of management preclude binding both officers and directors with the
fiduciary's traditional obligation of loyalty. If management's tempta-
tion to self-aggrandize is strong, the restraints imposed by reputation
considerations do not seem equally strong—or at least any stronger
than in the case of trustees or commercial agents or partners.
The public stockholder is considerably more in need of the exclu-
sive benefit principle and its prophylactic implementation to protect
against self-serving behavior by management than a partner (at least
an active partner) or an individual principal in the typical commercial
context is likely to be. The stockholder, like the settlor of a trust, is
unable to specify the opportunistic behavior against which he or she
needs protection and is not much more able than the trust beneficiary
to monitor the decisions being made under such restrictions or en-
force compliance with those terms. Nor does the public stockholder
have the capacity of a commercial principal to specify limits, monitor
management, select officers or threaten, much less terminate, their
tenure. And while in theory stockholders elect "independent" directors
to perform those functions, the latter are likely to owe their selection
more to managers than to stockholders and are not easily removable
by stockholders.
No less significant, in the context of investor-owned public corpo-
rations, the notion of "consent" by the stockholders to departure from
the exclusive benefit principle is a problematic construct, whether
given ex ante in general terms or ex post by way of voting approval of a
specific transaction. If not entirely a fiction, it is a far cry from the
actual consent that may be given by a settlor of a trust, a commercial
principal or a participating partner. 42
42 The stockholders' relationship with management's self-serving behavior or conflicts of
interest does not easily lit into the contractual mold. At best, directors, not stockholders, negotiate
officers' contracts on behalf of "the corporation." If consent is given by some "disinterested"
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American corporate law has addressed both the matter of the rigor
of the fiduciary strictures and the problem of stockholder consent to
departure from them. Over the course of the last century, although
the conditions underlying the historic application of the exclusive
benefit principle and its prophylactic implementation in the corporate
context have not changed materially," the principle has been aban-
doned, notwithstanding the continued characterization of manage-
ment's relationship and obligations to the enterprise and its stockhold-
ers as fiduciary. As the legal doctrine has evolved, the restrictions on
managerial conduct no longer prophylactically forbid self-aggrandiz-
ing behavior. Although the exclusive benefit principle is not formally
rejected," the governing doctrine effects its rejection in part by the
ease with which it finds stockholder consent to its avoidance by "disin-
terested" directors or dispersed stockholders, and in part, by its con-
cept of "fairness."" To the extent that the formally required consent
directors to self-serving activity by officers or other directors, the notion that "the corporation"
is consenting simply imputes a will to the abstraction by reason of the acts of "disinterested"
directors. Stockholders need not be, and generally are not, consulted or involved in such consent.
If dispersed stockholder consent is sought, its actuality is clouded because there is little basis for
finding either the negotiations or the cognition or volition that characterize the classic concep-
tion of consent that contract law enforces. See infra notes 76, 113-14.
The institutional investor is apt to be much less vulnerable than the individual investor in
such matters, particularly where ex post approval of a specified transaction is concerned, but its
consent is not remotely comparable to that of an active partner or commercial principal. Not
only does its management's relationship with managements of portfolio companies implicate
interests that diverge from its stockholders' interests in monitoring loyalty, but institutional
investors, particularly mutual funds, often do not have a large enough or continuous enough
interest in any particular portfolio company to justify the costs or engagement in specifying or
monitoring the loyalty terms of their investment. See generally Keith C. Brown et al., Of Thurna-
'nerds and Timptations—An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 511
FIN. 85 (1906); John C. Coffee, jr., The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REY. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Share-
holder Activism, 79 Gm. LJ. 445 (1991). Moreover, notwithstanding recent changes in the proxy
rules, the willingness and power of institutional investors to collaborate in order to overcome
collective action difficulties are problematic. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, jr.,
Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mutt. L. Rev. 1997, `2055-
77 (1994). But el Dean Strickland et al., A Requiem for the USA—Is Small Shareholder Monitoring
Effective?, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (1996).
'Is Whether or not that implementation was as extensively invoked in restraining corporate
management and controllers as Marsh suggested, there is no doubt that it was pervasive, particu-
larly in industrial states. Compare Harold Marsh, jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966),
with Norwood I'. Beveridge, jr., The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyally: Understanding
the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (1992).
44 Compare Monet Bus. CORP. Aar § 8.31(a) cmt. 1 (1986) (section withdrawn 1988); Monet.
Bus. CORP, ACE § 8.61 (b) (3) (1996) ; PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 5.02 & cults. (1992). Legislation that authorizes management to take into account
the interests of other stakeholders qualifies the scope of the exclusive benefit principle and its
import to prefer the interests of common stockholders over other stakeholders.
45 Statutes do not contain a prophylactic prohibition against self-dealing, but often prescribe,
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need not be adequately informed or volitiona1, 46 and the test of fairness
permits the fiduciary to obtain some or all of the gain from self-dealing
for itself, the restrictions on self-aggrandizement arc not simply looser
than required by traditional fiduciary notions, but they tend to become
invisible.
Moreover, the role of the court in reviewing challenges to a par-
ticular claim of consent or fairness contemplates (and embodies) little
critical assessment of the actuality of the consent and little more check
on managerial determination of such "fairness." 47 Notwithstanding oc-
or sometimes permit but do not prescribe, a test of fairness in the absence of inft wined consent.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); ME. Rev. S•AT. ANN. t.ft. 13-A, § 717(1)(c) (West
1964); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986); MonEt, Bus. CoRP. Acr § 8.61 (b) (3) (1996).
But we CA].. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (3) (West 1990) (requiring fairness as well as disclosure and
approval). Sometimes informed consent excuses the fairness requirement. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
14A:6-8 (West 1969); mt: also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1568, 1377-80, 1384 (Del. 1996);
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) (rehearing en bane); Ryan v. Tad's Enter., Nos.
C1V.A.10229, 11977, 1996 WL 204502, at *5-14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996); Douglas M. Branson,
Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to
Corporate Directors, 57 FoRtioAm L. REV. '375, 385-90 (1988); Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto,
Statutory Re,sponses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Mitering Down qf Fiduciary Standards?,
53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201 (1977). PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENIIATIONS § 5.02 (1992) makes the disinterested directors' consent sufficient if given to a
transaction they reasonably believe is fair (rather than is fair), and the stockholders' consent is
sufficient if the transaction is not wasteful, even though it may be unfair,
'.''Such consent may be given in the corporate charter, which raises serious problems as to
disclosure. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (Mass. 1937); Everett
v Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (N.Y. 1942). In any event, the scope of the required disclosure is
increasingly being limited by statute. compare MODEL. Bus. CORI'. AcT §§ 8.60(4) clot. 4, 8.62(b)
& clot. 2 (1996), with PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDXFIONS
§ 5.02(a) (1) & cults. (1992). Approval of the transaction must he given by disinterested directors
and sometimes by disinterested stockholders. The relationships which satisfy the "disinterested"
clirector requirement do not suggest a critical (let alone conventional contractual adversarial)
stance toward the self-dealing director whose transactions the "disinterested" directors are asked
to approve. See, e.g., Mooat. Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.31, 8.60 & elms. (1996); PRINCIPLES OE CORP.
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 1.23, 1.34 (1992); David Yermack, Good
Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449, 450-54
(1997). The absence of such a stance is nut offset by either the manner of selection of the
"disinterested" director (whose selection generally requires the CEO's approval) or by attitudes
likely to he generated in their normal occupation (which often is that of executives or retired
executives of comparable corporations). Nor is the mode and amount of their compensation
likely to sharpen their critical view. It does not detract from this conclusion then "disinterested"
directors [nay i .ellect shareholder interest more faithfully than "interested" directors. Compare
].aura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and
Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. Rim 898, 904-05 (1996), with Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three
Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. Coal'. L. 1, 18-22 (1966), and Sariiai Bhagat and
Bernard S. Black, Do Independent Directors Matter? (1996) (manuscript on file with Boston College
Law Review).
'17 In the case of unilateral appropriation without formal consent, management must gener-
ally establish that the result of the transaction was fair to the corporation. See, e.g., N.V. Bus. CORY.
LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.6I(b)(3) (1996); PRINCIPLES Op CORP.
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casional pious allusions to the exclusive benefit principle in opinions, 48
the surviving body of corporate fiduciary doctrine has lost that princi-
ple's normative underpinning:I 9
 Apart from occasional references to
the "market" as benchmark, it. offers murky and permeable limits on
management's self-aggrandizing behavior and serves more as an ad-
monitory ghost that hovers than a substantive proscription.
Possibly the dilution of fiduciary loyalty strictures in the context
of corporate management responds to perceptions of lesser need (be-
cause of the restraining influence of market pressures and reputational
concerns) and of larger net costs of over-prohibiting than in the cases
of agency and trusts or partnership. But the perceptions of lesser need
or greater cose° are hard to justify. Moreover, the benefits to stockhold-
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02(b), 5.04(h) (1992). In die case of mana-
gerial appropriation to which stockholders or disinterested directors have consented, the lack of
fairness or the presence of waste must generally be dem onstrated in court by the challenger. See
N.Y. Bus. CUs('. LAW § 713; Monm. Bus. Com , . Ac:r tti 8.61(b) (3); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02(b), 5.04(b). The challenger's burden is even
heavier when courts la to see a loyalty problem and invoke the business judgment rule or focus
on whether the procedure by which the transaction was negotiated and executed was fair and
scant the issue of substantive fairness. See, e.g., Williams, 671 A,2d at 1384; Rankin v. American
Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811-12 (Sup. Ct.), affil, 387 N.V.S.2d 993, 993 (App. Div, 1976);
cf. In re Wheclabrator Techn., Inc., 663 A.20. 1194, 1200 (Del. Ch. 1995) (controlling stockholder
in merger). In any event, the judicial notion of substantive "fairness" appears to tolerate consid-
erable overreaching. Compare, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 069 A.2d 79, 84
(Del. 1995), with Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 635 A.2d 1110, 1115-17 (Del. 1994);
compare also Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1105, 1107-08 (Del. 1985),
with Rabkin v. Olin Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM 11 95,255 (Del. Ch. 1990).
A less demanding test that focuses on easily met formal requirements obtains in the case of
MBOs anti in the case of defensive maneuvers again.st possible or proposed take-overs. Thc results
that the "enhanced" (in contrast to "strict") .jtulicial scrutiny that the opinions require is little
nurse critical than judicial review of management's business jt tdgment. Compare. Marcel Kahan,
Pararruntrit or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. Coup. LAw 583
(1994), with the "stories" discussed in Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: Flow Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work ?, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997).
48 See, e,g„, Bailey V. Jacobs, 189 A.20 320. 324 (Pa. 1937); Kfinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.20 900,
910 & it.2 (Or. 1985).
"The dilution of management's fiduciary obligations of loyalty extends beyond self-dealing
transactions to other forms of self-aggrandizement. See Cellular Info. Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A2d
1180, 1184-85 (Del. Ch. 1995); PRINCIPLES OF CORP, GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 5.05 (1992).
"E.g., transaction costs for a firm in dealing with strangers instead of with management or
controllers (the cost of obtaining information, negotiating, risk assessment, etc.)—and the cost
of lost transactions in which the executive or director or controller is the sole source or the
cheapest source of a good or service that the corporation is thought to require.
In all types of transactions by managers ur controllers of publicly held corporations with their
stockholders or corporations it is theoretically possible that both parties will gain. Sonic transac-
tions are so laden with potential for gain kw the former and loss for the latter, temptation loa -
the former to realize the gain and difficulty in policing, that only the exclusive benefit principle
can systematically assure the stockholders against loss. Whether categorical prohibition of trans-
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ers of self-aggrandizing conduct by managers, if real, can be obtained
by consent; and because the consent required from stockholders or
their "agents" (disinterested directors) is largely fictitious and readily
obtained, the reluctance to continue background prophylactic restric-
tions on self-aggrandizing behavior by officers and directors of public
corporations is something of a puzzle. So too is the movement of
doctrine in the direction of looser (or indeed abandonment of) restric-
tions of fairness if such consent is obtained. 5 '
Possibly the notion is that management's overt compensation is
insufficient, and management of publicly held corporations will not do
its job unless it has the added incentive of indeterminate interest in
the residual returns from self-aggrandizing transactions; possibly, those
returns will avoid the need ultimately to adjust management's overt
compensation. That certainly is a dominant strand in theories offered
to justify management insider trading and buy-outs. 52
 The social cost
of thus relaxing traditional fiduciary proscriptions is said to be minimal
because stockholders expect it in public corporations; and, with liquid
markets for their stock, stockholders are said to be able to diversify the
risk of "improper" managerial self-aggrandizing conduct and thus to
make such conduct less costly to them.53
actions from which both sides might gain, in the interest of protecting one side against the high
likelihood of systematically losing, is "worth" it poses empirical questions and the essential
normative question.
Similar problems are presented by the claim that the exclusive benefit principle dampens
the incentives of managers, who are said to need the incentives of gains from self-dealing in order
to do their best for the stockholders.
51 See, e.g., Mom. Bus. CORP. Act' §§ 8.60-63 & elms. (1996); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02 & cults., 5.05 & cmts. (1992). That result
may reflect the special cost that would be incurred by public corporations because of potentially
perverse litigation incentives. Non-compliance with a requirement of consent to departure from
easily identified prophylactic restrictions could be challenged by nuisance suits (driven by lawyers
for dispersed stockholders, whose only interest is in the fee) in cases in which principals or
partners with a more substantial stake would (or would not) knowledgeably waive non-compli-
ance. See Davis, supra note 3, at 49-52.
52 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The. Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983). Studies of management buyouts suggest higher returns to the
enterprise, presumably as a result of management's enhanced incentives. However, there is no
good measure of the extent to which those increased returns are (1) implicit in the enterprise
(without any need for added effort by management) but. unknown to public investors who are
hough! out, or (2) attributable to contributions by the persons financing the buy-out by way of
new ideas, new capital or better monitoring of management. For analysis and review of the
evidence on the efficiency of management buyouts, see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. Buscit,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcquismoNs 3911-429 (2d ed. 1995). In either case,
cashed out stockholders may have a better claim to share in the resulting increased values than
does management. Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298-99 (Del. 1996).
It is not self-evident that the benefits of diversification of risk are obtainable when the
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That agency costs are inevitable does not preclude efforts to re-
duce them. There is room to debate the questions implicit, in those
efforts. Empirical evidence on the quantifiable net gains or losses to
the parties or society from the exclusive benefit principle is difficult to
obtain. 54
 In the absence of such evidence, the question is not answered
by reference to "contract" as a relevant process, by antiseptic economic
models, or by speculation about how rational wealth-maximizing actors
in them (even when organized as institutional owners) i 5 would per-
form, any better than by intuitions about (and experience with) the
acquisitive behavior of management.m The exclusive benefit principle
is a normative response to long experience in such matters. It is not
readily apparent how the erosion of that principle over the last century
did (or a shift to "contract" as a norm would) result in net economic
benefits to investors or to society. Moreover, as we have noted, values
other thari utilitarian concerns are entailed in classic fiduciary restric-
tions—whether imposed upon management or controllers or trustees
or agents.
Whatever the reasons for relaxing the restrictions on manage-
ment's appropriative behavior, a curtain of fiduciary discourse still
screens the loosened strictures. The fiduciary rhetoric of courts may
have an impact on investors' expectations; but these expectations are
hardly fulfilled by the modest effect of such admonitory rhetoric on
variable diversified is risk of management misappropriation. But even if some such benefits are
obtainable, unless the terms of engagement on those premises are clarified and the scope of
management's permissible self-aggrandizing behavior is made explicit, the appropriate cost-
benefit analysis must he made in terms of the relationship of shepherd to sheep.
54 E.g., how measure the extent and cost of transactions lost by invoking the principle or its
prophylactic implementation? Is the cost to be sustained from offering management the added
incentive that comes from self-dealing greater than the cost of more explicit modes of compen-
sation? How measure the costs to stockholders and litigation costs to society of the theoretical
indeterminacy and practical porosity of a standard of "fairness"? Second order consequences also
are hard to measure—e.g. Will the cost of the relaxed stricture and increased returns t o manage-
merit, in a world in which investors understand the fact and risks of such relaxation result in
higher charges for capital? Is that cost preferable to the cost of the higher level of fees that
management would charge or reduced efforts it would extend, if the strictures were not relaxed?
See generally Davis, supra note 3.
The monitoring role of institutional owners on management's efficiency is unclean See
supra note 42. However effective it may be to energize displacement of management if economic
disaster occurs, there is little evidence on effectiveness of such monitoring in non-crisis situations.
Its impact on the duty of loyally is even less clear.
544
 A priori analysis suggests little loss from a prophylactic rule. Compare ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE Law § 5.4.2 (1986), with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fische!, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & Ecosf. 425, 442 (1993). And there is reason to doubt Ihe teaching
of economic models that argue for looser restrictions on managerial self-aggrandizement. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolts, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholders Wealth
(Feb. 1996) (unpublished discussion paper no. 179, on file with the Boston College Law Review).
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legally permissible or actual appropriative behavior. 57 Possibly, as we
shall see, although it rarely offers any determinate restrictions or any
rationale for relaxing the classic prohibitions, that rhetoric implicates
tighter limits on such behavior than does the diction of classic contract
doctrine."
2. Controllers
Dilution of the exclusive benefit principle for delineating manage-
ment's fiduciary obligations of loyalty is matched in the relaxation of
restrictions on self-aggrandizing behavior by controlling stockholders
("controllers"), particularly parent corporations, notwithstanding the
imputation to them of fiduciary obligations.59
To be sure, unlike management, controllers' function does not
formally entail performing services or operating or managing corpo-
rate assets as delegees of, and for the sole benefit of, public investors.
But when controllers exercise their power to influence management's
decisions in corporate affairs, they are effectively directing choices in
operation of the common assets on which public stockholders have a
pro-rata claim—i.e., structurally they are vested with power thus to act
on behalf of the stockholders in managing the common enterprise.
In the exercise of that power, controllers' fiduciary obligation
precludes their obtaining separate benefits for themselves—except as
specified compensation for services is provided. Their obligation is to
benefit all the stockholders collectively even if they cannot act solely for
the benefit of public stockholders because, unlike management, they
57 Cf. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs V.irstis Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE or BUSINESS 55, 75-76 (John W. Pratt & Richard .J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). It is worth
recalling in the context of such discourse that two decades ago, academics suggested that the
laxity and increasingly porous character of state fiduciary restrictions on managers' and control-
lers' self-benefiting conduct be remedied by federal legislation. See William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 696-705 (1974); Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary Standards Act, SO CI.Ev. ST. L. Rim 203 (1981). Nothing
that has happened in the interim suggests diminished need for a remedy tier such porosity.
5" See infra notes 89- 107 and accompanying text.
59
 Controlling stockholders have neither less power nor significantly less temptation than
does management to divert to themselves portions of the corporate assets at the expense of public
stockholders. Unlike management, the rational controller has the same risk-return incentives as
the remaining stockholders in making investment or operating decisions—except as it is effec-
tively diverting assets to itself. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971).
In the absence of some check on the controller's power to divert, the uncertainties faced by public
investors would wastefully raise the cosi of capital. The same considerations that support the
strictures of loyalty on officers and directors support comparable, but not identical, strictures on
controllers.
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are themselves participants in ownership and entitled as such to share
that benefit with the others. Like partners, their share of gains from
such activity is appropriately limited to their proportionate interest in
the enterprise. 6° As with partners, this is an adaptation of the exclusive
benefit principle that precludes any separate gain for the fiduciary and
requires return of all gain by the controllers to the collective, but
entitles the controllers to their proportionate share as owners.
Appropriative behavior by controllers or by parent corpora-
tions in intercompany transactions with subsidiaries, as by man-
agement in dealing with its corporation, is currently not restricted
by prophylactic prohibitions or the exclusive benefit principle,"'
even if it was so restricted historically. On the other hand, shar-
ing (more than occasionally on the basis of equality per share)
seems to be embedded in the "fairness" requirement for self=ag-
grandizing transactions, including those to which prophylactic
prohibitions cannot easily apply, like mergers,"2 or sales of con-
''"The doctrinal sources of the criterion of proportionate sharing (or equal sharing per
share) by controlling stockholders are to be found in state statutes, corporate charters and the
general understanding of the investment community. Equality of distribution per share is funda-
mental to the meaning of the concept of a "class" of stockholders and to valuing shares of stock
by reference to the firm's aggregate cash flow or net earnings or assets; and it is so pervasive in
the atmosphere of investing and trading in shares of stock that imputing investor consent to any
arrangement other than equal distribution of, for example, dividends per share, is difficult in the
absence of express provision therefor. Cf. Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 975-76
(N.Y. 1995).
Although forms of distribution other than dividends or liquidation—e.g., realignment of
participations by merger or recapitalization—are no less subject to fiduciary restrictions, the
equality of treatment principle is often rejected by the courts in those other contexts. See, e.g.,
infra notes 62-66. Such rejection does not purport to distinguish between "contract" and "fidu-
ciary" considerations as the authority therefor. Nor does it offer any meaningful measure of the
extent of permissible departure from equality—notwithstanding that fiduciary obligations should
thus restrict the controller more narrowly than would "mere" contract obligations, which would
permit it to seek to favor its own interests over those of other stockholders. See infra text
accompanying notes 93-97.
61 See, e.g„ International Radio Tel. Co. v. Atlantic Communications Co., 290 F. 698, 701-02
(2d Cir. 1923); Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720; In re Wheelabrator Techn., Inc., 663 A.2d 1194,
1203 (Del. Ch. 1995); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971); Ewen v. Peoria &
Eastern Ry. Co., 78 E. Supp. 312, 316-17 (S.D.N,Y. 1948).
62 The cases leave some uncertainty as to the reach of the sharing principle in defining
fiduciary restrictions on controllers. See, e.g., John G. Coffee, jr., Transfem of Control and the Quest
for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling inefficient Ones?,
21 Din.. J. CORP. L. 359, 362-63 (1996). In parent-subsidiary mergers (both cash-out and stock-
for-stock types), for example, courts (1) often invoke fiduciary terminology and die notion of
rescission and rescissory damages, and (2) permit valuation by reference to premiums paid in
comparable transactions—both of which suggest some kind of sharing, possibly on an equal basis
per share. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981), modified, Weinberger
v. UOl', Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983); see also In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2(1 319,
333-34 (Del. 1993). Ma cf. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). Proportionate shading
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 or other transactions involving control."' Judicial opinions some-
times suggest that public stockholders formally consent to departure
from the norm of equality by controllers but the reality of that consent
is doubtful."'"
The conditions that drive the doctrinal loosening of restrictions
on controllers appear to be that exclusive benefit and proportionate
sharing principles impose more net costs on public corporations and
is also suggested in other transactional settings. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369,
375 (7th Cir. 1941) (involving freeze-out merger of minority shareholders); Goggins v New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Mass. 1986) (involving freeze-cult
merger of non-voting public shareholders); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp„ 342 A.2d 566, 574
(NJ, Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (involving freeze-out merger of minority public shareholders). In
others, the courts talk of public stockholders being "fairly" treated if the value of their "get" in
the merger equals the value of their "give," computed on DU" pre-merger gains basis that may
take no account of the enterprise's imminent potential of synergistic gains from combining with
the acquirer. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985). But cf. Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc„ 684 A.2d '289, 298-99 (Del. 1996) (Cede & Co. II). That approach suggests
the possibility of no sharing at all and allocation of all gain to the controller. The ambiguous
scope of "fairness" in such transactions is illustrated by a comparison of the two Delaware Supreme
Court decisions in the Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems litigation and the Rabkin litigation.
See supra note 47; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371-72 (Del. 1993) (Cede
Co. I).
Many cases dealing with minority discounts suggest an equal treatment requirement, but
they are not entirely consistent among themselves and they are less than consistent with cases
dealing with premiums on sale of control, particularly in appraisal proceedings. Compare Cede Co'
Co. II, 684 A.2d at 298-99, and Cavalier Oil Corp, v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989),
and Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 977 (N.Y. 1995), with Rapid-American Corp.
v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 n.2 (Del. 1992). See generally John C. Coates IV, Fair Value as a Default
Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Boston College Law Review).
Sales of control, unaccompanied by a merger with the acquirer, appear generally not to
require sharing, but to require proportionate sharing if courts perceive undue potential for
mulcating public shareholders in particular transactions. See generally Einer Elhauge, The. Trigger-
ing Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 1465 (1992). But see Coffee, supra
note 62.
64 See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 476 (Cal. 1969) (en bane).
Fairness sometimes, but not often, prevents controllers from gaining unequal returns per
share in the contexts of allocation of tax gains between parent and subsidiary. Compare, e.g., In
re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., 473 E2d 262, 263-65 (9th Cir. 1973), and Alliegro
Pan American Bank, 136 So. 2d 656, 657-62 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1962), with Meyerson v. El Pasa
Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 792-94 (Del. 1967), and Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 204 N.E.2d
643, 645-47 (N.Y. 1965). See also PRINCIPLES Or CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS Arm RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 5.11(a) (2) (1994).
Disclosure requirements in repurchase transactions (whether made for control purposes or
otherwise) effectively implicate proportionate sharing. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429
A.2d 497, 503-04 (Del. 1981), modified, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
Formal consent may he said to be given when approval of a majority of the minority public
shareholders is obtained, see e.g., Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983), but
the substance of such consent does not equate it with the knowledgeable and volitional consent
of individual actors. See supra note 42.
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their controllers than on partnerships or agents. Rejection of those
principles is necessary to permit controllers to have the incentives to
increase the value of the common enterprise and thereby presumably
the value of the public stockholders' interest. 6" As with the loosened re-
strictions on management, this premise is debatable. A priori, a parent
corporation's power and incentive to overreach public stockholders in
its subsidiary in intercompany dealings seems to be more extensively
usable and more costly than that of managers in self-dealing, Moreover,
the constraining influence of reputation considerations is considerably
less, as is also the likelihood of meaningful stockholder (including
institutional stockholder) disapproval by action of "independent" di-
rectors or otherwise.° Categorical prohibition of such departures from
proportionate treatment may (or may not) be less costly than permitting
them. The argument for such departures rests on disputable behav-
ioral assumptions6" and requires empirical inquiries that are difficult
to make. 69
However valid may be the reasons for abandonment of the exclu-
sive benefit and proportionate sharing principles in corporate law, the
problem remains of finding criteria for determining the limits of man-
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, ChS,
4, 5 (1991). See also infra note Ill and accompanying text.
67 The possibility that the rigors of those obligations may be tempered and their costs lessened
by consent to deviation from them in particular transactions is no less present than in the case
of partners and agents. Indeed, obtaining "consent" from dispersed shareholders is plainly less
of an obstacle to approved departure from those obligations than is obtaining the consent of
partners or commercial principals.
6g See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
69 Arguably self-dealing between parent and subsidiary can produce more benefits in many
kinds of transactions. But it may produce more harm in other kinds of transactions than similar
dealings between management or an individual controller and its corporation. Reputation con-
siderations are likely to impose fewer restraints on parent. corporations than on individuals. In
any event, the impact of such considerations on imposition of a prophylactic prohibition does
not detract front the need for the exclusive benefit principle.
To assess the incentive value or encouraging or permitting a controller to self-deal or
appropriate a disproportionate share of corporate assets implicates (as with management) weigh-
ing the net costs that tighter fiduciary restrictions might impose against the net costs of the more
porous restrictions that have evolved. A priori, it is hard to envision any need to compensate a
controller for going private or a parent for discovery costs in deciding to absorb a subsidiary, or
indeed for added risk in undertaking the absorption. To be sure, differences in context (e.g.,
absorption of a subsidiary by a long-term controller in contrast to absorption by a recent take-over
acquiror or by a recent private buyer of control) implicate differences in the need for, or power
of, incentives for the controller to acquire 100% of the subsidiary. Comparable considerations
affect determinations of fairness and of equal or proportionate treatment requirement; fine
instance an arms-length tender offer price may be a "fair" payment to a minority in a subsequent
merger that is part of it unitary acquisition. But ef ziri, v. VII Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783
(Del. 1993).
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agers' and controllers' appropriative behavior." Debate on this prob-
lem and the accompanying arguments about the costs and benefits
of management's and controllers' appropriating corporate values for
themselves raises the question whether restraints on managers or con-
trollers are, or should be, planted in the soil of contract 7 ' rather than
in fiduciary ground. Courts' and legislatures' alteration of the struc-
ture of the loyalty obligations of corporate management and control-
lers by making them less restrictive than the traditional fiduciary obli-
gations of trustees and agents does not answer those questions. Nor
does the difficulty in separating the restrictions imposed by "mere"
contract from those imposed by diluted corporate fiduciary notions by
a bright line" preclude analysis of the different conditions that under-
lie, different norms that are embodied in and different consequences
that attend each.
II. FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FIDUCIARY AND
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF MANAGERS OR CONTROLLERS
The dominant school of contractarians emphasizes maximizing
corporate value rather than assuring appropriate distribution of such
value between the assertedly contracting parties—i.e. managers or con-
trollers on the one hand and public stockholders on the other.
The classic fiduciary duty of loyalty is considered to be a significant
obstacle to that maximizing goal, particularly as it prophylactically
precludes transactions that might maximize—or at least make—gains
for the enterprise." The classic fiduciary duty is also said to dampen
'm For example, the possibility that a buyer of control at a premium will enhance values, which
is not so easily asserted for a controller's diversion of values to itself in a freeze-out, is said to
justify precluding a priori requirements of equal treatment in sales of control. Whether such an
incentive is necessary for the seller and whether the cost is worth the benefit are debated
questions. See Coffee, supra note 62; see also William D. Andrews, The .Stockholder's Right to Equal
Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient
and Inefficient  Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Qj, EcoN. 957 (1994); Elhauge, supra note 63.
71 Invocation of contract to define restraints on controllers is difficult to justify since there
is no express or formal agreement on the matter between controllers and the other holders of
common stock; and the basis for implying agreement through operation of the market is too
fragile to carry such a heavy burden. Compare Frank A. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982), with Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders
in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAI.. L. REV. 1072 (1983).
72 See Market St. ASSOC. V. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991); Kham & Nate's Shoes No.
2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at
438. Compare Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Rihstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti -Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (discussing the contract doctrine of good fitith
as a limit on managerial opportunism).
a See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 698.
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the incentives of decision-makers by denying them the rewards from
self-aggrandizing behavior that they think necessary, in addition to the
rewards for which they expressly contract. 74
 Hence, the policy aspira-
tion of contractarians is to reduce, if not to eliminate, state-imposed
fiduciary restrictions on the power of corporate managers and control-
lers to engage in conflict of interest transactions or otherwise to serve
themselves collaterally at the possible expense of public stockholders.
One doctrinal mechanism for fulfilling that aspiration entails char-
acterizing the fiduciary relationship as simply a contractual relation-
ship, and thus transforming fiduciary obligations to "mere" contract
obligations. 75
 The suggestion is that state-imposed Fiduciary strictures
are simply background rules which, like "the law" of contracts, ( 1) are
assumed to have been consented to by the parties and incorporated in
their relationship, except where they have agreed otherwise, and (2)
are to be interpreted by courts as if they were part of a contract that
the parties have deliberately drafted. By imputing a structure that
assumes consent of the parties to the presence or absence of state-im-
posed fiduciary restrictions on management and controllers, the man-
datory role of state-prescribed strictures can be muted.
The concept that thus immunizes the parties from "outside" state-
imposed mandates and validates their arrangements as freely chosen
is the notion of imputed consent. Consent to be bound by (and knowl-
edge of the meaning of) state-imposed rules is imputed to the parties'
arrangement to the extent that they do not reject any or all of those
rules, which they are presumed to be free to do. Commentators have
long noted the ambiguity (if not complete absence) of stockholder
consent in these matters. 7' But even if it is appropriate thus to impute
It is assumed that the efforts of managers and controllers are key to such maximizing, and
that only incentives furnished by loosening the constraints of loyalty will induce them to exercise
appropriate effort to that end. From that point of view, the law, which cannot firrce managers or
controllers to engage in wealth-maximizing behavior for the enterprise, should at least not get
in the way by restricting their self-appropriative behavior.
Insofar as the fiduciary mandate embodies the duty of care, it may also be an objectionable
example of state intrusion; bun it does not impose a heavy obligation because it requires only the
minimum acceptable level of performance rather than the maximum possible level.
75 See Langbcin, S141 Ira note 2, at. 665-67; see also supra note 2. Common law strictures are
treated like public choice theorists treat statutes—as bargains among legislators—and thus as
bargains among those favoring and those opposing the strictures.
76
 is not necessary to resolve the philosophical or sociological problems entailed in WieCT,
mining the meaning of coercit at or consmit. See, e.g., MICHA El. TRERI I ,COCK, TI I E LIMITS OF
FREEDOM on CONTRACT 58-77 (1993); R. Nozick, Coercion, in PH I u't rv , SG I EN( E ANI1 METHOD
440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). It is enough to recognize the difference between
the consent that powers classic contract consequences in a one-on-one transactit in and the
consent imputed to public stockholders (by reason of the action of "independent" directors or
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consensual acceptance of (and corresponding broad power to reject)
the rules known as "the law" of contracts, it does not follow that
importation of fiduciary rules can be as validly imputed so as to make
them simply part of a "contractual" arrangement. Nor can assent to
deviation from any or all of those rules be as appropriately treated as
volitional alteration of an otherwise actually consented to "contractual"
arrangement.
A. Traditional Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations
As we have seen, essential to the fiduciary concept is the function
of the fiduciary (a function reasonably expected by the beneficiary) to
perform services or operate the beneficiary's property for the benefit
of the latter. In the case of trusts or principal and agent relationships
(and pro tanto of corporate management), the fiduciary must act for
the beneficiary's exclusive benefit, and, in the case of partnership or
corporate controllers for their shared benefit in proportions desig-
nated ex ante. The fiduciary's entitlement to expressly provided com-
pensation does not open the door to any other mode of reward from
dealing with the corporate assets or the stockholders. Correspondingly,
the beneficiary is relieved of any concern about specifying or monitor-
ing the fiduciary's appropriative behavior in the course of exercising
the broad discretion necessarily delegated.
In contrast, in the classic contract relationship each party acts to
benefit himself or herself in carrying out the common enterprise—ex-
cept as the terms of their arrangement otherwise forbid. Each is ex-
pected to act, in the areas of discretion that the contract permits, for
his or her own interests and without any regard (in classical contract
responses to proxy solicitations) to conduct by managers or controllers. Rational apathy precludes
dispersed stockholders from acquiring the relevant information that the model contracting party
would seek. Rational apathy also deprives their consent to the terms they formally accept of the
volitional choice embodied in the consent of the model contracting party and its ability to
self-protect. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
5, 11-12 (1985). And if free and knowledgeable consent is not otherwise given by stockholders
to exposure to the perils of guileful behavior by managers or controllers, the market hardly
operates to supply such consent derivatively. See Brudney, supra note 42, at 1420-27; Frankel,
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 3, at 1253-59.
Indeed, to the extent that any consent can be attributed to actual (as distinguished from
hypothetical) rational wealth-maximizing stockholders to managerial or controllers' potential
opportunism it is reasonable to believe they expect overt compensation of management to be its
sole compensation, and shares of stock of a single class to be entitled to equal treatment vis-a-vis
sharing in corporate assets. So far as "the law" that they can be said to incorporate goes, it is also
not unreasonable to believe that they expect it to protect them against management and control-
lers taking more than they are overtly promised.
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doctrine) or with some indeterminate regard (in more modern con-
tract rules) to whether the other is benefited or injured by those acts
on his or her own behalf. 77
 Consistent with that functional difference,
the contract relationship does not require or contemplate that either
party will substitute "trust" for "wariness" in the relationship.
To be sure, the contract concept, like the fiduciary concept, re-
quires a limit on the benefits that a party may take for himself or herself
from the common enterprise at the other's expense. But the traditional
fiduciary concept—whether viewed in terms of exclusive benefit or
sharing—would, by definition, forbid or substantially curtail opportun-
istic behavior by management or controllers that the contract notion
permits. 78
 Moreover, traditional fiduciary doctrine permits "consent"
to departure from those principles only in limited transactions, 79 and
17
 For a richer discussion of these differences, see Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 3.
Classical contract doctrine responds to a world in which autonomous human beings are deemed
to negotiate with one another volitionally and more or less knowledgeably as adversaries who
seek some level of cooperation, They enter into exchange transactions or long term relationships
whose terms they are said to have bargained out, and from which each expects to gain, each
entertains the possibility of opportunistic behavior and each understands the other to do the
same. In that world, each party bears (and expects to bear) the cost of protecting himself or
herself against opportunistic behavior by the other—by obtaining information from available
sources (including the other), and by insisting upon or yielding protective covenants in exchange
for other benefits. To he sure, these conditions do not underlie all contractual relations, and to
the extent that the conditions do not obtain, classical contract doctrine has been modified by
notions like duress, good faith and unconscionability.
7" See RESTATEMENT (SEc,orm) OF TRUSTS § 170 & cmt. w (1959); see also State ex rel. Hayes
Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 983, 986 (1964).
79 AS a matter of procedure, departure from conventional (i.e. trust and agency) loyalty
fiduciary strictures is more appropriately limited to ex post consent to a specified transaction than
extended to ex ante approval of specified types of transactions, See UNIE. TRUSTS ACT §§ 5, 18,
78 U.L.A. 774, 790 (1985). But see CONARO ET AL., supra note 37, at 355-57 (setting forth form
of blanket ex ante consent sought by some practitioners).
The posture of the parties and the bargaining and information disadvantages that underlie
fiduciary obligations argue strongly against ever finding that a person, particularly a passive
investor, is sufficiently informed and competent, or is acting freely enough, to consider a pur-
ported waiver of all duty of loyalty to be valid-notwithstanding the validity of an appropriately
informed waiver or ex ante contract foregoing particular fiduciary entitlements. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUS • I'S § 222 (1959) (forbidding exculpation of trustee for intentional breach of
trust or waiver of liability prohibition against trustee for profiting from trust); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) of TRUSTS § 170 colt. W (1959); MODEL Bus, CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) & cm. 1
(1996); RESTATEMENT OE THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 & cmts. (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1991) (discussing the limits of client consent and the requirements of cognition for consent to
be free and valid); ScoTT & FitxrcuER, supra note 15, §§ 170.1, 222, 222.3; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1110(a) (1994) (prohibiting relief from a fiduciary's responsibilities or liability under ER1SA).
The considerations that impel relaxation of limits on consent to the waiver of duty of care
under agency and trust law, or among partners or parties in a close corporation, or under recent
corporate statutes, do not impel or justify permission for complete waiver of duty of care or for
significant waiver of duty of loyalty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 cmt. a (1959);
626	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:595
in any event it imposes stricter conditions than classic contract norms
require for effective consent to modify the arrangements. Thus, disclo-
sure requirements for consent under traditional fiduciary doctrine are
more demanding than contract doctrine generally requires. 8° In addi-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. D (1959); see also Branson, supra note 45, at
387-94 (1988); DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 3, at 921-23.
Not only is judicial unwillingness to uphold waiver of all obligations of loyalty or care likely
and appropriate, but there is also judicial insistence on specificity in the terms of the consent or
waiver. See Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 237 (Wash. 1974); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1664-76 (1989). Compare restrictive rules on waiver in U.P.A. §§ 103(b),
404(b) (1994), 6 U.L.A. § 16, 58 (1995). Practicing lawyers may insert blank check ex ante
consents to self-dealing by their clients, see, e.g., CONARD, supra note 37, but the scope and validity
of those consents remains to be determined in concrete cases. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.09 & cults. (1992); DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation,
supra note 3, at 922; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 249-51 (1995). If consent can narrow loyalty (i.e. exclusive benefit)
obligations in partnership and close corporation contexts, it cannot trump the fiduciary require-
ment of fairness, which should put a tighter cap on the arrangements than does the "contract"
notion of good faith or unconscionability. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
8° See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 4.11, 4.14 (1990); DeMott,
supra note 37; DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 3, at 906; see also DUGGAN FT AL.,
CONTRACTUAL NON-D1SCLOSURE 51-55 (1994). Compare cases cited supra note 29, and RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 392 (1959), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216,
cunt. k (1959), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981), and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) op Rums §§ 551 (1979), and FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.13 (2d
ed. 1986). But cf. Moorr. Bus. Com ,. ACT § 8.62(b) (1996).
Courts that deny fiduciary obligations for directors who buy corporate shares from individual
stockholders effectively deny contract or tort duty to disclose in that context. See Percival v. Wright,
2 Ch. 421, 426 (1902); see also Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933). Courts that
affirm fiduciary duties require disclosure. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121
N.E. 378, 379-80 (N.Y. 1918). The Delaware requirement of "complete candor," which was derived
from a fiduciary obligation, was thought to reflect a requirement of fuller disclosure than federal
securities legislation. See Richard A. Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Federal Securities Law
and State Corporation Law, 121 CORP. LAW 73, 73-74 (1986). That the Delaware Supreme Court
may on occasion have erased that difference does not equate the fiduciary disclosure requirement
with any comparable contract law requirement in practice or in theory. Compare Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992), with Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778-79 (Del. 1993), and Nicolet,
Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1987). But cf. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669
A.2d 79, 88 (Del. 1995); Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276-77 (Del. 1994).
See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off The Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087 (1996). It does not detract from that conclusion
that contract doctrine and tort doctrine require disclosure in circumstances involving a confiden-
tial and trusting relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1981); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1979); Jour: D. CAIAMAR1 & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CON-
TRACTS 369-70 (3d ed. 1987).
Debate over the circumstances in which information should be disclosed to one contracting
party by the other, whether rooted in considerations affecting the cost of, and incentive for,
discovering it, see, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7J. LEGAL. STUD. 1 (1978), or otherwise, see, e.g., MICHAEL. J. TREBILC;OCK, THE LIMITS
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 102-26 (1993), proceeds on the assumption that rational parties are
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tion, the volition that drives such consent must be more clearly evi-
dent in the traditional fiduciary context than in the classic contract
con text. 8 '
Not only do traditional fiduciary loyalty restrictions thus differ
from classic contract rules in content, but fiduciary strictures are not
designed like contract background rules to fill gaps in, or enforce,
explicitly specified preferences or protective provisions that the parties
selected. On the contrary, the fiduciary rules that the State prescribes
supply the content of the parties' preferences and protections, not
mere "neutral" background rules to implement particular preferences
or protections selected by the parties. 82 In contrast to the essentially
neutral character of the restrictions on opportunistic behavior im-
posed by the background rules that are part of contract doctrine,"
fiduciary rules are historically comprehensive and one-sided. They aim
to protect the beneficiary but not the fiduciary against contingencies
in areas of conduct in which contracting parties can (and generally
do) select adequate protective terms, but beneficiaries and stockhold-
ers (even if they are otherwise considered contracting parties) can
negotiating at arms-length on a more or less equal basis. The notion of the fiduciary as alter ego
of the beneficiary rejects that each-for-himself assumption. Moreover, it makes discovered infOr-
mation the "property" of the beneficiary at least as much as of the fiduciary; the cost of acquiring
it (and the incentive to do so) is financed by the beneficiary, through the fiduciary's fee or other
compensation.
81 See Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 3, :41 1235-42; supra notes 23-2l and accompany-
ing text :
82
 It is the inability of the stockholder as residual-taker to express, or even to signal, the
restrictions on management's or controllers' self-serving Behavior in all the various contingencies
that may occur during the relationship that gives rise to state-imposed rather than party-pre-
scribed obligations. See supra Stole 41. Fiduciary restrictions cannot be derived from protective
terms that restrict management's behavior because the arrangement. between the parties gener-
ally cannot, and does not, contain adequate terms. In the fiduciary posture, the restrictions are
determined at large, rather than interstitially by derivation from the articulated terns of a
contract. Possibly the same generalized strictures that traditional fiduciary loyalty obligations
entail could be embodied in the language of a contract, Given the same posture of the parties,
the reach of that language would create fOr the parties and the courts interpretive problems
comparable to those that arise in defining fiduciary obligations.
The same considerations argue against viewing the fiduciary duty of care as a "mere"
contractual obligation. Indeed, its content derives from conceptions of negligence and is no more
contractual because the relationship is consensual than is the obligation of a driver to a passenger
who simply is along for the ride and does (or does not) consent to narrowing the driver's
state-imposed obligations.
83
 For example, the rules prescribing conditions to be met in forming, or requiring good
faith in performing, or forbidding unconscionability in the operation of contracts are designed
to set limits on how f1ar each contracting party can help himself or herself' at the expense of the
other. So too are various interpretive rules that address ambiguities or gaps in one-on-one
contracts. They operate in light of the protective provisions that. the parties have specified to limit
the powers that each has given to the other
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not. 84 The functional role of management, as actor for the stockhold-
ers, and the structural bargaining incapacity and passive posture of
the public stockholder which result in the state thus imposing broad
fiduciary restrictions, preclude a court from "interpreting" the mean-
ing or scope of these so-called background rules as if they were delib-
erately and freely adopted by contracting parties. 85
Indeed, even in the contract ambience, the notion of the parties
importing into the contract all or some of the externally imposed
background rules—that resolve ambiguities in the terms or enforce the
contract—is problematic. It is a strong, and not entirely plausible,
suggestion that even relatively knowledgeable parties to contracts un-
derstandingly include in their choice of provisions any or all of those
background rules." It is even less plausible to convert state-imposed
fiduciary strictures into parts of a voluntarily assumed contract. The
84 Background rules that prescribe good faith or proscribe unconscionability generally ad-
dress elaborated preferences expressed in more or less deliberately formulated provisions by
parties. The background rules that govern the fiduciary relationship contemplate unarticulated
preferences and a significant disparity of information (or potential to acquire it) and volition
between the fiduciary and the beneficiary. This is not to deny that the structural position of
dispersed parties to many kinds of standard form contracts for consumer goods or services is
comparable to that of public stockholders and that the "law" of contracts takes some account of
those structural disadvantages through concepts like duress, adhesion, unconscionability and
good faith that limit the structurally advantaged parties' power, See FARNSWORTH, supra note 80,
§§ 4.16—.19, 4.26—.28 (1990 & Supp. 1996).
'Thus to impute to dispersed stockholders ihe consent to managerial selfserving behavior
by a rational wealth-maximizing party to a contract assumes that the stockholder is, like such a
party, filling in the interstices of a restrictive arrangement with management or controller that
he or she has otherwise constructed. Rut in fact it is the entire structure of the restrictions that
the fiduciary obligation defines. Hence, in resolving a claimed ambiguity in a corporate fiduciary
obligation, different considerations are to be consulted than are appropriate in interpreting
ambiguities or filling gaps in a contract drafted by the parties. The rational wealth-maximizing
party to a relational contract, whose terms have been negotiated by him, deals in an arena which
enables him to consider and provide covenants against the risks of his opponent's opportunism.
He is subject to different ex ante imputations of consent to opportunistic behavior than is the
rational wealth-maximizing public stockholder who is not playing in that arena, cannot protect
himself by contract, and therefore must put his head into the lion's mouth when he invests. The
tatter rationally seeks protective reassurances from the state against risks of management's or
controllers' opportunism that one in the former's position may rationally believe cost more than
they are worth. Even if maximizing joint wealth were the socially appropriate norm for the
fiduciary relationship, it does not follow that a mode of filling gaps or ambiguities, which is
appropriate for negotiated contracts, will produce the same wealth-maximizing result if invoked
to define the boundaries of fiduciary obligations.
The parties do not make, or participate in making, those rules; and their "consent" to
incorporating them is derived by imputing to the parties knowledge of the uncertain state of the
law and the possibility of its changing in unforeseeable ways over the life of their relationship.
That imputation rests upon the alchemy of the market rather than upon any explanation that
lawyers or advisors are assumed to offer to the parties or upon knowledge they otherwise normally
acquire.
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beneficiary's power to waive, or consent ex ante to departing from,
those strictures in specified circumstances does not enhance that plau-
sibility. Whatever may be said of the power of contracting parties
expressly to trump or alter state-imposed contract rules, 87 different
considerations color—and limit—the power of a beneficiary to opt out
of fiduciary loyalty entitlements.
B. Corporate Law Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations
Currently imposed corporate fiduciary obligations substantially
dilute classic fiduciary restrictions. Indeed, they contemplate that the
fiduciary may benefit at the expense of the beneficiary, or at least fail
to share all gains from self-dealing, but they offer no theory to justify—
or operating guide lines to measure—the limits of opportunistic be-
havior. Doctrinally, authorization of the power to self-deal may derive
either from rejection of the exclusive benefit principle or from the easy
imputation of consent by stockholders to departure from the principle
by managers or controllers. Statutory prescriptions appear to rely on
both." In either case, existence of the power to obtain collateral benefits,
as by self-dealing, raises the question of limits on its exercise.
As a matter of positive law, restrictions on self-dealing imposed by
courts in fiduciary terms in the corporate context are increasingly
slack. But their terms may be somewhat tighter than the restrictions
that are imposed under classic contract doctrine or might be imposed
under contract doctrine that either requires "good faith" by parties in
performing contracts, particularly contracts infected with touches of
duress or adhesion, or prohibits results that are unconscionable."
87 See Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); DeMott, Contemporary Challenges, supra note 3, at 484-85;
DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 3, at 921-23. Express contract does not trump all
fiduciary rule.
g's See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (3) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); N.Y,
Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986); Mont:i. Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.61,63 (1996); MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) & cents. (1986) (section withdrawn 1988).
8"Evolving corporate fiduciary obligations appear to be narrowing the disclosure require-
ments imposed on directors seeking stockholder consent to depart from the prohibition against
self-dealing, but developing conceptions of adhesion, unconscionability or good faith appear to
be expanding disclosure requirements for contracting parties seeking comparable consent. Com-
pare Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Sc Elec. Co., 12i N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1918), with MODEL Bus,
CORP. ACT §§ 8.60(4) cmt. 4, 8.62(h) & cint. 2, and Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
925 F. Supp. 1270, 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1996). See STEVEN J. BURTON AND ERIC G. ANDERSEN,
CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 3911414 (1995);
PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 502(a) (2) (1992);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CORP. L. 997, 998 n.5
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The congruence, if not overlap, of the restrictions that each might
impose on management is suggested by the ubiquity of the concept
"fairness" in describing both evolving fiduciary obligations and con-
tract obligations." And the deterrent sanctions that enforce fiduciary
obligations,9 ' although rarely available for "victims" under classic con-
(1988); compare In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1991), with Brass v. American Film
Tech., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150-52 (2d Cir. 1993), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 161 (1981). On the other hand, adumbrations from more recent Delaware decisions suggest
more demanding disclosure obligations of fiduciaries. See Hamermesh, supra note 80; see also
DeMott, .supra note 37. But if Kahn v. Lynch Communication. Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 88-89 (Del.
1995).
The volition that is required to power the consent of dispersed stockholders to such depar-
tures is becoming hard to find, see, e.g., Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (N.Y. 1942); see also
PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02, 5.04, 5.06 (1992),
even though it may be more than the evolving contract doctrine requires in the murky areas of
undue influence and unconscionability. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, §§ 4.20, 4.28; Richard
Croswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1993); see also sources cited infra note 101.
For analyses that discuss and compare the conditions required for valid stockholder consent
to depart from fiduciary strictures with the conditions that meet "good faith" requirements of
contract doctrine, see Coffee, TOM note 79, at 1653-64 and John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting
Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Care of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
919 (1988). See also Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. Market
St. ASSOC., v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593-95 (7th Cir. 1991); Khans & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First
Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1356-59 (7th Cir. 1990).
9() For authorities that reject fiduciary terminology in favor of a requirement of fairness, see
Mom!, Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(a), 8.61(h) (3) & emus. (1996), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 cult.
(1996) and PRINCIPLES OF CORI'. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.01, 5.02
(1992). See also supra note 36; rf. PRINCIPLES ON CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 5.09 & cmts. (qualifying limitations). Fairness is also a notion that tinctures the "good
faith" that the law of contract requires. See U.C.G. § 2-103(1) (b) (1994); DeMott, Fiduciary
Obligation, supra note 3, at 892-902. Weidner and Larson suggest that the term fairness is more
restrictive in the fiduciary context. See supra note 36 (discussing Revised Uniform Partnership
Act). But if. Russell M. Robinson, Nowru CAROLINA CORPORATION LAIA" §14.3, 233-234 (suggest-
ing that eliminating reference to "fiduciary" and substituting "fairness" in corporate law is
designed to curtail sanctions against misbehaving directors).
9! flat result dove-tails with the inability of the dispersed public stockholder adequately to
provide sanctions by Contract. See supra notes 15, 82. To be sure, the deterrent sanction in the
corporate context is sometimes not as severe as it might he. Compare Boardman v. Phipps, 2 App.
Cas. 46, 104, 112 (1-I.L. 1967), and Greenan v. Ernst, 184 A.2d 570, 578 (Pa. 1962) (allowing
errant corporate fiduciary to be compensated for services rendered), with Holden v. Construction
Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 356-59 (Iowa 1972), and American Timber & Trading Co. v.
Niedcrmeyer, 558 P.2d 1211, 1223 (Or. 1976) (denying even such compensation); cf. Snepp V.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1980). However, recent cases occasionally suggest that for
directors, or controlling stockholders in contexts that would invoke sharing principles, rescissory
damages that may well be punitive are appropriate. See Cede & Co, v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 371-72 (Del. 1993) (Cede & Co. I); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del.
1993); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983). But cf. Cinerama, Inc. v. Techni-
color, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1140-47 (Del. Ch. 1994), affil, 663 A.2d 1156 (1995). See also Goggins
v, New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2r1 1112, 1119-20 (Mass. 1986); Booth, supra
note 80, at 100-83. In any event, the uneven application of deterrent sanctions in corporate law
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tract doctrine, 92 may occasionally be matched by the sanctions imposed
under contract doctrines like good faith or unconscionability."
Notwithstanding the movement of positive law, if the limits on
self-aggrandizing conduct are to be faithful to their proclaimed origins
in fiduciary premises, they should be more restrictive than limits de-
rived from contract premises—even those premises underlying the
more flexible contract doctrines that protect structurally dependent
(often dispersed) parties disadvantaged by bargaining power and in-
formation disparities. Analytically, the function of the fiduciary re-
quires courts to approach gray areas in the interpretive process with a
sense that the center of gravity of the fiduciary obligation is in the
beneficiary's interests. In contrast, the center of gravity of the obliga-
tion of an arm's-length contracting party is in its own, rather than the
other party's, interests. Even if contract doctrines—such as good faith
or unconscionability—locate the center somewhere in between, nei-
ther contract theory nor contract doctrine requires one party to focus
solely on the interests of the other or permits the courts to interpret
the contract through a lens with such a focus.
Diluted corporate fiduciary obligations start from the exclusive
benefit principle, and the question is how far from that starting point
the fiduciary may be permitted to go in appropriating benefits for
itself. Claims of bad faith or unconscionability start from the premise
that the party charged was entitled to seek all the advantage the
contract might permit, and the question is how to limit the benefits he
hardly reduces the deterrent role of disgorgement and rescissory damages to their non-role as
sanctions for violation of contracts generally. See Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 1354. Nor does
the fact that disgorgement and rescissory deterrent remedies are occasionally allowed, see GEORGE
E. PALMER, LAW or REsTrruTioNt § 2.12 (1978), in contract or tort cases that involve especially
"egregious" misbehavior or conditions comparable to those involved in the classic iiducdary
context diminish the significance of those remedies as a functional attribute of the fiduciary
relationship. See id, § 2.11 (1978 & Supp. 1996); see aLso Stone v. Martin, 355 8.F...2d 255, 259-60
(N.C. 1987). Such episodic references do not assimilate "mere" contract or tort to the fiduciary
relationship. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 94,
105 (5th ed. 1984) (suggesting those remedies are not always available and, in any event, are
limited in scope); DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 3, at MS; Jackman„ supra note 21.
92 .See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, Supra note 80, §;§ 12.3, 12.8 (2d ed. 1990); George M. Cohen, The
Fault Line in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225 (1994). Contract damages are not always
confined to payment that is only compensatory, see, Gergen, supra note 28, at 1072-75;
Scallen, supra note 3, at 912-13, but that general theme is central to the notion of damages in
contract. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 1356.
93 Victims of "bad faith," unconscionable behavior or duress occasionally receive the benefit
of deterrent sanctions. See, e.g., Alan a Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers,
251 LEGAL STUD. 405, 409, 414, 428 (1996); see also, Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for
Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1994) (discussing the remedy of rescission in limited
circumstances).
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or she may appropriate at the expense of the other party. The concept
of "fairness" should not carry the same substantive import in the
fiduciary context that it may in the contract context. "Fairness" in
corporate law fiduciary terms is said to embody limits on the consen-
sual94
 allocation of gains to management or controllers from self-ag-
grandizing conduct by reference to arm's-length bargains or "the mar-
ket"95---a restriction that is said to limit managers'. or controllers' gains
more rigorously than does the freedom of the parties to deal under
contract rules, particularly classic contract rules.° 6 It is not self-evi-
dent that the market or the hypothetical arm's-length bargain is a
sufficiently restrictive standard of fairness for a fiduciary.e7
To depart from the .exclusive benefit rule as has corporate law,
and substitute a "fairness" test, does not require shifting the fiduciary
relationship to the arm's-length relationship contemplated by the mar-
ket for an exchange transaction. On the contrary, although the depar-
94 1f the self-dealing transaction is "consented to" by stockholders—by vote of either inde-
pendent directors or dispersed stockholders—the ephemeral quality of the consent invites a
state-imposed cap on the substance of the transaction, even if the matter is viewed as one of
contract.
95
 Instead of the exclusive benefit principle which would deny any and all gain to managers
or controllers, fairness permits them to share in the gain; but it restricts the sharing by reference
to how the market or some comparable arms-length standard would divide the gain between the
transacting parties. See International Radio Tel. Co. v. Atlantic Communications Co., 290 F. 698,
702 (2d Cir. 1923); Ewen v. Peoria & Eastern Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Cookies Food Prod., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouses Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 453-54 (Iowa 1988);
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.31 cmt. 4 (1986) (section withdrawn 1988); Clark, supra note 21, at
73-75; Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335
(1948). But cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71.
96 See Clark, supra note 21, at 74-75.
97 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 5.4.2 (1986). Fairness so-defined leaves
the fiduciary with incentives to self-aggrandize because the number of unpoliceable (and unliti-
gated) transactions (resulting from the beneficiaries' rational apathy, if nothing else) assures that
a market price rule will result in transactions that are rarely if ever at prices less favorable to the
fiduciary than market, and on average at more favorable prices. Something more than what the
market price would give the beneficiary is the requirement of fairness for one who places his
economic interests in the hands of another to manage for him, and like public stockholders is
in the structurally disadvantageous position to control or monitor a management exposed to
strong temptation to overreach. Cf. Mosser v, Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1950). Indeed, if the market
price is more favorable to the beneficiary than the fiduciary's cost, there is good reason to hold
the latter to the market price that the beneficiary could get if not hobbled by the fiduciary. See,
e.g., Security Exchange Act Release No. 26,198 (Oct. 19, 1988) (dealing with parent-subsidiary
transactions). In contrast, nothing better need be required for a victim whose entitlement is
defined by contract in a relationship that contemplates indeterminate gain for each of the parties
at the possible expense of the other on the assumptions of a market transaction. The contract
notion of good faith is designed, at most, to rectify the disadvantage of a person who is innocently
(or at least not culpably) exposed to opportunistic behavior in a relationship entered into on the
premises of free and equal exchange in a market transaction. Hence, arguably he or she is entitled
to no better than he or she would have gotten in such an exchange. See SEA Release, supra.
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Lure may contemplate the possibility of some gain for the fiduciary, the
weakness of the stockholders' consent argues for a deterrent sanction
that the market standard simply cannot supply. The information asym-
metry and uneven bargaining relationship between the parties coupled
with the "trust" that colors their dealings require the fiduciary to end
up with less gain than the market might give, and the beneficiary to
receive a better "deal" than a stranger might give." Delineating the
limits of that "deal" is difficult. But that does not justify the otherwise
questionable use of the contract-derived market test simply because
"the market is there."
In any event, in the cases likely to present challenges, a market is
generally not available to measure fairness. Instead, fairness is sought
as the product of a bargain that the parties would have struck if they
were dealing at arm's length. It may be achieved anywhere within a
range, generally a wide range, of possible results"—determined by the
opinions of experts hired by the parties, who generally rely on the
terms of actual transactions that they deem comparable to the trans-
action at hand. The fiduciary relationship, even as diluted for corpo-
rate managers or controllers, suggests a location of fairness within that
range that is considerably less favorable to management or controllers
than do contract premises,'°° including good faith requirements.m The
98 See Cooler & Freedman, supra note 15; Mitchell, supra note 3.
99 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61(b) (3) & cmt. 2 (1996).
uxr Management or controllers' temptation to self-aggrandize and the difficulty of detecting
or selectively prohibiting it call for restrictions on such behavior—whether because of fiduciary
or contractual obligations. However, the considerations that generate fiduciary restraints (i.e. the
fiduciary's role as alter ego) call for the determination of fairness to the beneficiary in self-dealing
transactions by managers to be at or beyond the end of that range of prices that is most. favorable
to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary is selling, the test of fairness should be at or beyond the
upper end of the range; if the beneficiary is buying, it should be at or beyond the lower end.
This substantive test of fairness for a fiduciary may appropriately contrast with any substantive
lest of ''good faith" or other standard in contract doctrine. To the extent that notions of
unconscionability or lack of "good faith" inform contract doctrine (which contemplates an
arm's-length adversarial relationship between the parties), for example, they point to limiting the
behavior of the person charged by reference to the other end of the fairness range. Culpability
would be demonstrated by behavior that leaves the complainant worse off than he would be at
the end of the range of fair behavior that is least favorable to the him. See, e.g, Williams v. Walker
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
Positive law, at least in Delaware, may impose a lesser burden of proof of fiiirness upon
management or a controller than upon a trustee. See Scow & FRATCHER, supra note 15, § 496;
cf. Michelson v. Duran, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979); In re Whcelabrator Techn. Shareholders
Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995). Although the weight of that burden is not easily
measured, it does not leave management quite as burdened as a plaintiff in a suit on an
arm's-length contract.
101 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-306(1)
(1994). "Good faith," may he narrowly understood to stretch the interpretive process no further
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fiduciary concept of "fairness" thus invoked implies, and appears in
many cases (even if not in all) to produce, tighter restraints on man-
agement's and controllers' conduct than contract doctrine would re-
quire.'n It has similarly more restrictive implications for controllers'
conduct, particularly in control transactions.
The only restrictions on self-dealing in corporate law that are
systematically colored more by the contract notion than by the diluted
fiduciary concept appear in the limits on management's express com-
pensation. To measure the limits of management's substantively, if not
formally,"13
 self-appropriated compensation by reference to "waste"'"
than is permitted if the focus is on the autonomy of contracting parties and the explicit choices
embodied in their contract. Or it may be read more broadly as an instrument of social policy
that, however, is limited by the need to take account of the claim that the players are autonomous
parties who have made explicit choices. Compare Steven j. Burton, Good Faith in Articles I and 2
of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1533, 1558-60 (1994), with Richard E.
Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 789, 795-98 (1993). However
narrowly or broadly "good faith" maybe interpreted in the commercial contract context, it entails
the notion of limits that derive from terms that actual adversaries in a real society more or less
consciously seek to impose on, or arc willing to concede to, one another. Thus whether the
problem is interpreting the scope of an authorization in the text of a contract or a related legal
stricture, or simply of the discretion intended by the parties or left by a gap, "good faith" requires
one party to "consider" the other party's interest in exercising discretion under their contract
and thus seeks limits on the extent to which the party may serve his own interests. Rut it does
not seek (as does the classic fiduciary stricture) to prevent him or her from serving those interests,
whether or not at the risk of some harm to the other party. Hence, while it thus imposes limits
on opportunistic behavior, see. Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of judicial Reconstruction of Contracts,
7l INU. 14. 45, 77-80 (1995), it is apparently not as confining as a "best efforts" requirement, see
Gergen, supra note 28, at 1066, and, at least formally, it is less confining than even current
corporate fiduciary doctrine. Cf authorities cited supra note 14; FARNSWORTH, supra note 80,
§ 7:17A at 330; John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 79 at 1653, 1658. Compare Steven _J. Burton, Breach
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HA ay. L. REv. 369, 394-95 &
n.109 (1980), with Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Accelera-
tion: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Thx. L. REV. 169 (1989), and
Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith: Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CoutrEt.t. L. REv. 810 (1982). See generally BURTON & ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH
(1995); DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 3, at 892-902; Saul Levmore, Variety and Cni-
firrmity in the Treatment of the Good -Faith Purchaser, 431 1„,r;c.m. Spun. 43 (1987).
1°2 In some kinds of cases, principally management buy-outs and defenses against take-overs
or controllers' absorption of subsidiaries or going private transactions (for which it is hard to
decipher any restraint. imposed by "mere" contract), the cases often invoke the fiduciary construct.
and, at least fin -malty, seek to test the propriety of the transaction by its "fairness." See, e.g.,
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1986); Paramount Communications,
Inc, v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954-57 (Del. 1985). But cf. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389-90 (Del.
1995). For restraints on controllers that require some (possibly proportionate) sharing, particu-
larly in control transactions, see supra notes 62 and 64.
"See supra note 46.
11" Compare the predominance of reliance upon the concept "waste," see, e.g., Cohen V. Ayers,
596 F.2(1 733, 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1979); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996);
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suggests analogy to the contract notion of "unconscionability." judicial
review of the board's decision in terms of "business judgment"101' fur-
ther supports the idea of the discretion available to parties in a "mere"
contractual relationship. While the phenomenon can be explained,m
it is hard to see how it can be justified.'°7
In sum, traditional fiduciary loyalty strictures more rigorously pro-
tect common stockholders against opportunistic behavior by managers
or controllers than does classic contract doctrine. Even the diluted
corporate law fiduciary obligations should—and often do—offer more
protection than does classic contract doctrine.
C. The Wealth Maximizing Norm And The Fiduciary Relationship
The effort to assimilate the fiduciary relationship to "contract"
generates questions with respect to the relevant contract concept to be
tapped to solve problems of delineating restraints on management's
Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979); Marx v. Akers, 606 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996);
R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4-276, 4-277 (Supp. 1997); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.03(a) (2)(c) (1992); Paul K. Rowe, Defending Executive
Compensation in the Courts: Substance and Strategy, 6 INsicu No. 4, at 12 (Apr. 1992); cl Byrne
v. Lord, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,987 (Del. Ch. 1995); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., No.
C1V.A.7956, 1990 WL 154149, at *2 (Del, Ch. Oct. 9, 1990), and the occasional references to the
requirement of "no relation to the value of the services rendered." See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S.
582, 591-92 (1933); see also Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1948);
cf. Investment Company Act §36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 36 (1994), interpreted in Krinsk v. Fund Asset
Management, Inc., 875 F.2d 404, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1989); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928-32 (2d Cir. 1982).
111r' The. carte blanche given to "disinterested" directorial judgement that the compensation
(1) will produce future services and (2) will be reasonably worth the cost is only occasionally
withheld, but that withholding is almost never followed by judicial determination that the com-
pensation is in fact excessive. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-41 (7th Cir. 1979); Beard
v. Elmer, 100 A.2d 731, 737-39 (Del. 1900); Byrne, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 1 98,987.
lir' One possible explanation for contract-based limits on management's overt compensation
is that, structurally, neither the exclusive benefit principle nor its prophylactic implementation
can be invoked in that circumstance. Also, such transactions are formally framed in contractual
terms, in contrast to most self-dealing or other self-appropriative transactions. More plausibly,
employment compensation rests on faciors peculiar to each management and corporation.
Therefi•e, unlike self-dealing or other 'nodes of self-aggrandizing, it does not yield to generalized
strictures except of the vaguest kind. The intractability of the incentive and the quantifying
problems in determining "excessive" compensation often seems to drive courts to the contract
stance (and the "waste" standard) in order to diminish the need to confront that intractability.
See, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y.
App. Div. 194 ); see also Car] T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and Me Failure of Corporate
Democracy, 41 Burr. L. REV. 1 (1993); Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty
as a Toniefor the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. CORP. LAw 786 (1992); Detlev Vagts,
Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, H J. CORP. LAW 231 (1983);
Geoffrey S. Reltnert, Note, Tlw Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce
Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (1985).
I 07 The problem of quantifying the limits of "fairness" is not easier than that of quantifying
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or controlling stockholders' self-serving behavior. There is more than
one vision of "contract,"'° 8
 and contract doctrine offers more than one
approach to such problems.
The suggestion that state-imposed fiduciary strictures are simply
terms of a contract to which the parties have consented and which
they may freely alter is the predicate for the contractarians' special
method of interpreting ambiguities or gaps in the "contract," including
the fiduciary background rules that the parties are assumed to have
adopted." Gaps or ambiguities with respect to a particular contin-
gency that cannot be resolved from the terms should be resolved by
asking what hypothetical, rational, wealth-maximizing parties would
have provided to be done in the contingency under scrutiny if they
had thought of the problem when they entered into the relationship.""
The answer given rests in large part on the premise that such hypo-
thetical actors would believe that the added incentives offered by
personal gain from self-aggrandizing use of corporate assets would
stimulate managers or controllers to create gain for all—i.e., to in-
crease the value of the enterprise.'" Therefore, restrictions on fiduciar-
ies in such transactions should be deemed waived by beneficiaries (or
effectively eroded) in the interest of a systemic expectation of net gain.
the limits of "non-waste." But the former standard suggests narrower and more appropriate limits
than the latter.
'See, e.g., PATRICK ATIYAII, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT (1990); TREB qLCOCK, supra note 76;
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970). Quite apart from communi-
tarian assumptions, see generally Peter Linear, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational
Approach, ANN. SURV. A.M. L. 139 (1988), there are variations in the autonomy-based norms resting
on libertarian or utilitarian assumptions. Compare EAsTERBuooK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, cps.
4, 5, and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 702, with CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PitomiisE, 7-18, and Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLum. L. REV. 269 (1986),
and Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV.
821 (1992), and Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 17, 28—SO.
10 The beneficiary is presumed to be as able to freely consent to value-increasing, self-dealing
transactions as is a party to a contract to agree to circumvent mutable restrictions imposed by
"the law" of contracts.
11 " See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at
703-04; Langhein, supra note 2. The assumption is that the parties would have provided an
identifiable solution to the ambiguity or gap. Of course, the further assumption is that in the
absence of ambiguity or gap the rational wealth-maximizing party must yield to the terms of the
contract, which by definition contain neither ambiguity nor gap.
ill Rational wealth-maximizing stockholders should be willing ex ante to enter into arrange-
ments that allow appropriative behavior by managers or controllers that, on average, is expected
to induce efforts to enhance the collective value for all. Certainly such shareholders should be
willing to do so if it does not deprive them of some of the expected gains to the self-dealers from
the efforts; they should rationally be willing to do so even if ex post they receive no part of those
gains, but share in the expanded value of the enterprise. And, in theory, they should be willing
to enter into such arrangements ex ante even it' they may, in the end, be deprived of some of
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Notwithstanding the contractarians' ideological premise that fa-
vors fulfilling individuals' freely made choice, their interpretive meth-
odology rejects that premise. Whether the framework of analysis is
characterized as "fiduciary" or as "contract," resort to hypothetical
bargainers to resolve ambiguities scams choice by individual actors. It
drives the decision not by the moral force of actual individuals' consent
inferred in the particular case, but by the dictates of the contractarians'
general conception of efficiency in the run of cases." 2
The proffered joint wealth-maximizing justification does not nec-
essarily implicate maximizing the wealth of each party. On the con-
trary, both in theory and in practice, it entails the distinct possibility
of reducing the wealth of some of the parties while augmenting the
wealth of others.'" Moreover, if this justification clues not actually
contemplate totally depriving the stockholders of any share in the
insiders' gain or indeed inflicting loss upon them, it leaves open-ended
the questions of whether or how to share any enhancement of joint
their putative share of the expected enhanced enterprise values. Iii sum, public investors in
common stock should rationally accept the possibility of distributions to them from the bottom
hall' of the dispersion of expected returns even though the top would be skimmed by controllers
for themselves—presumably because that arrangement would increase the mean expected return.
See. EAsTEIthrtooK AND FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPoRATE LAW, 110-26 (1991).
The practices of venture capitalists in demanding senior participations along with equity suggest
reason to doubt the acceptability, let alone the rationality, of such open ended risk-return
allocations. At the very least, consent to indeterminate departure from equality of treatment of
public stockholders can only be considered informed and volitional if it rests on express disclo-
sure. For debate on the question of the need for and propriety of unequal distribution, compare
Victor Brudney and Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Marrs and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974) and Brudney, supra note 71 with Easterbrook & Fist:het, supra note 71
and EnsminiRook & supra note 66. Compare Robert W, Private Sale of Control
Transactions: Where We. Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 248 (1985), with Ethauge, supra
note 63.
112 see, e.g., David Charily, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpre-
tation, 89 Mum, L, itvv. 1815, 1823 (1991); Daniel P. Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral
Force, 10 LAW & Pun.. 235 (1991). The hypothetical actor is simply a lictitions implementer of
the contractarians' conception of an efficient solution. The only choice that fffily informed
idealized wealth-maximizing actors will make is the choice that efficiency requires, presumably
calculated by netting the probable costs and benefits of possible alternatives and "choosing" the
most beneficial solution.
113 The "incentive" justification for open-ended self appropriative compensation rests upon
the premise that on average it will stimulate executives and controllers to cause greater returns
fir stockholders. But "on average" implies that in many cases self appropriative behavior will
exceed collective gain. Moreover, even if such appropriative behavior were required to leave
public investors with some share of gain from enhanced value of collective assets, the price that
they would rationally charge for their capital would be larger (possibly wastefully larger) than if
management's and controllers' rewards were limited to those explicitly and overtly described. See
supra note 54. In any event, if "gain" to public stockholders is measured by reference to a
benchmark that managers or controllers (rather than the neutral "market") lix, as when gain is
measured by stock prices that can be, and often are, manipulated in anticipation of control
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wealth and insiders' gains. That open-endedness has implications for
the "efficiency" that the norm is claimed to produce.'" However ap-
propriate a joint wealth-maximizing aspiration and its associated risks
may be in a world of bargains between more or less equal and informed
contracting parties, it is not easily justified in the conditions that
determine the fiduciary relationship between dispersed stockholders
and management or controllers.
No less important, this justification rests on value or policy pref-
erencesn 5
 that are subject to substantial debate in the context of the
relationship between management or controllers and dispersed public
stockholders. Traditional fiduciary loyalty restrictions emphasize pre-
venting appropriation of the beneficiary's assets by her "alter ego."
Maximizing the value of those assets may (or may not) require prohib-
iting such appropriation. But the need to prevent or discourage the
appropriation undoubtedly qualifies the maximizing aspiration and
removes it from the center of the fiduciary focus. If the preferability
of the traditional fiduciary notion is to be measured in conventional
cost-benefit terms, considerable empirical inquiry is needed before its
historic role is rejected in the corporate context.
If values not touched by such cost-benefit analyses are to be con-
sidered, the case for rejection of that historical role is not made strong-
er."'' Indeed, the explosive increases in rewards to management during
transactions, there is the question whether any real gain is realized by stockholders from the
self-dealing transactions.
114
 Doubt about the actuality of the parties' consent, see supra notes 76, 112, leaves uncertainty
about what preferences are being vindicated to produce the theoretically optimal result. There
are theoretical problems in the way of achieving optimality if bilateral bargaining is the process
to which the parties are deemed to be remitted. There are also troublesome interpretive questions
about the operation of the norm of the hypothetical investor (e.g., how could that investor
"clarify" ambiguity in one clause of an integrated complex agreement without altering others?
Cf. Trebilcock and Dewees, infra note 154, at 416) and questions about judicial institutional
competence to determine efficiency. Other obstacles to achieving efficiency (such as second-order
costs) are generated by permitting indeterminate self-aggrandizing transactions by managers or
controllers. See supra note 54.
115
 Derision of the notion that "ethics rather than economics best explains the legal rules,"
see, e.g., EAsTERuitook & FISCHE1„ supra note 2, at 428 n.6, seems to assume that the normative
preference for efficiency (derived "rigorously" from assumptions about the human condition and
human values) is not itself an ethic (embedded in its assumptions) to which other "ethics" may
not (or may) be preferable. Cf. TaEnn.cocK, supra note 80. In any event, the question remains
whether the asserted irrelevance of ethics is a function of the demands of efficiency rather than
of the strength of political power.
116 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also William W. Britton, Game Theory and
the Restoration of Honor to Cmporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRF,SSIVE CoitvoitATE Lsw 139
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995); William W. Bratton, Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law,
44 Rtric.v.us Rev. 75 (1992); Chapman, supra note 11. Other relevant values that are scanted
by con tractarians involve possible consequences of social discontent or dilution of moral aspira-
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the past several years—a phenomenon that has attracted more than
casual discontent in the press—have occurred in connection with
management's express compensation."' In that matter, as we have
seen, legal doctrine limiting self-aggrandizing behavior is closest to the
contract model and furthest from the fiduciary model. The contract
model's relatively low barrier to managerial self-rewards may not be
the only reason Rif the immense increases in managements' express
compensation. But a higher barrier would surely have reduced the
magnitude of those increases whose value to the firm and to society is
not self-evident. Whether such returns to management are necessary
(or indeed relevant) to increasing returns per unit of risk or stock
prices to stockholders remain questions to be examined.
Some contract doctrine may implicate restrictions on managers or -
controllers comparable to those created by the diluted fiduciary doc-
trine restricting management's and controllers' self-aggrandizing con-
duct." 8 Other contract doctrine is less restrictive than even the least
restrictive corporate fiduciary notions that have yet been accepted. To
urge that contract rather than fiduciary doctrine does (or should)
govern, or that the latter is merely a sub-species of the former, pro-
duces little illumination unless the relevant contours and policy impli-
cations of each are identified. In any event, if "mere" contract theory
should determine the restrictions on management and controllers, the
lions resulting from public perception of gaudy returns to controllers and management, particu-
larly al times when touch of society may be subject to contraction in welfare and opportunities.
117
 E.g., in the limn of stock options whose strike prices can be reset downward, and appar-
endy frequently are, if the price of the stock tinder option goes down and whose upward
possibilities of return are subject to factors unrelated to management's contribution to the
enterprise. The theory appears to be that what goes up is attributable to the talent and energy
of management, but that what goes down is unrelated to any lack of managerial talent or energy.
'Th at such options also create other conflicts of interest about dividend policy and other matters
between management and stockholders has been suggested. See Vermack, supra note 46; Christine
M. Jolts, Unraveling the Puzzle of Stock Repurchases: The Role of Incentive Compensation in
Buyback Decisions (unpublished manuscript, on file with Boston College Law Review).
118
 As the courts and legislatures erode features of traditional fiduciary doctrine that protect
dispersed stockholders and augment comparable features of developing contract doctrine (like
good faith or WICOIISCkmahility) the lines may converge, or even cross, Cots tractarians who equate
corporate fiduciary obligations with "mere" contract obligations do not predicate their equation
on such developments. Rather, the vision of contract to whirls they would assimilate corporate
management's (or controllers') obligations to the public stockholders is the classic notion of the
bargain between two autonomous persons of roughly equal bargaining power and access to
information. Their obligations inter se are envisioned as considerably narrower than those im-
posed by expanding conceptions of duress, adhesion, tinconscionability and good faith in con-
tract. doctrine. See, e.g., Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. Clare Corp., 74 F.3(1 128, 132 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("Contract law does not require parties to be fair, or kind, or reasonable, or to share
gains or losses equitably.").
640	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. It8:595
fiduciary rhetoric should be abandoned, and investors should be so
informed.' [ ' The presence or absence of protections provided for pub-
lic common stockholders by contract doctrine should be articulated,
and the extent of the asset diversion permitted by contract doctrine
should be explained.'"
ill. OBLIGATIONS TO SENIOR SECURITY HOLDERS
A. The Incongruity of Fiduciary Obligations
Public investors in bonds and preferred stock are not much—if
any—more informed or volitional in accepting the terms of their
contracts than are investors in common stock. Nor are they less subject
to self-aggrandizing behavior by management or controllers than are
public shareholders of common stock ("commons" or "common stock"),
or immune from such behavior by the holders of common stock as a
class. 12 ' The question arises whether such senior investors are in a
position comparable to beneficiaries so as to require the protection of
fiduciary obligations, even as diluted as these obligations are in pro-
tecting public common stockholders. The answer rests essentially on
two propositions. First, although management is not technically an
agent, functionally it is usually the representative of the common stock
interest rather than of senior securities' ("seniors") interests in con-
119 Some authorities would candidly alter the fiduciary terminology and further loosen the
threads woven by historic fiduciary obligations. See supra note 90; Alex Elson & Michael L.
Shakeman, The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product,
49 Bus. LAW. 1761, 1770-78 (1994).
122 For example, does the contractarians' model contemplate appropriation of gain or diver-
sion or assets by controllers or management in any and every transaction that is not more or less
expressly forbidden? Are the limits on such permitted appropriation or diversion determined by
the imputed preferences of the hypothetical wealth-maximizing rational investor if, ex ante, he
could have foreseen the appropriative or diverting conduct? IF the contractarians' model con-
templates other criteria for setting limits on such conduct, how do they operate?
If, as is occasionally suggested, many public investors understand the answers to these
questions, there is little cost in requiring plainer explanations to them. If some public investors
do not so understand, explanation would further both efficiency and equity—presumably at some
cost but not necessarily at a net cost. See NORMAN S. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE
ENTERPRISE 452-59 (1940).
121 The need !Or senior security holders to restrict management arid common stockholders
in exercising powers over the firm and its assets that may be permitted by contract or law arises
in several contexts—possible insufficient attention to or incompetence in the task of making
sufficient returns for the seniors; taking risks beneficial to juniors but injurious to seniors with a
greater likelihood and extent than the seniors expected or could reasonably expect for the
returns promised; diluting the seniors' claims by borrowing additional amounts; coercing dilution
of the restrictions on common stock. All of these possibilities exist if' the seniors have not guarded
against such behavior by protective covenants or if fiduciary strictures are not invocable.
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ducting corporate affairs. Second, the seniors' relationship with com-
mons does not contemplate (and cannot contemplate unless expressly
provided) that the latter should have an agent's role for the former,
or even a self-denying role, in the creation of the wealth of the enter-
prise and the division of its returns. Both propositions are disputed. 122
We will return to the first proposition after examining the reason and
import of the second.
1. Obligations of Common Stockholders to Senior Security Holders
The senior security holders contribute to the enterprise in order
to obtain a limited, albeit prior, return from the use of their contribu-
tion by the commons through the efforts of the management that in
theory the commons indirectly select. But the commons are not en-
gaged in a limitedly compensated effort on behalf of the senior inves-
tor. They are not acting solely, or indeed principally, for the benefit of
the seniors. Nor is the common stock subject—except as specified in
the investment contract—to the seniors' direction or control. Essential
to arrangements between the seniors and the common stock is the
premise that the latter will attempt to derive for itself (in part from the
use of the seniors' contributions) the residual share of the enterprise's
value, generally an indeterminately larger share per unit invested than
goes to the seniors. Those arrangements rationally contemplate that
the common stock will operate the enterprise so as to maximize (or at
least to increase), not merely to preserve, the value of its assets. Hence,
in contrast to the seniors' limited interest, which directs channeling
the use of their contributions in the direction of preserving more than
maximizing the value of the assets, the common stock's interest is in
conducting operations and taking risks so as to maximize the value of
the assets and correspondingly their interests. That posture suggests
that the commons should deal with the collective assets in their discre-
122 The literature on the subject is extensive. Compare William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt
Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92 [hereinafter Bratton,
Corporate Debt Relationships], and William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of
Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. lbw. 667 [hereinafter Bratton, Convertible Bonds], and William
W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZO L. REv.
371 (1984) [hereinafter Bratton, Interpretation of Contracts], with Albert H. Harkey, The Financial
Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corpora-
tion, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 47 (1986), and Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate
Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986), and Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13
J. CORI.. L. 205 (1988), and Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. lbw. 1165 (1990). See also David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the Case for
a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST.,Joi ,i's L. REv. 1023 (1991); Thomas R. Hurst & Larryji. McGuiness, The
Corporation, the Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J.L. & Com. 187 (1991).
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tion without the constraint of self-denying fiduciary restrictions, or
indeed of seniors' consent as to how the assets may be used or distrib-
uted—except when those matters are addressed explicitly or implicitly
in the "contract." 123
Not only are traditional fiduciary restrictions thus incompatible
with the function of the arrangements between senior investors and
common stock, but they are not necessary to effect the protection
against opportunism that the seniors require. Senior security holders'
interest in current, as well as ultimate, returns is limited. And the
priority of seniors' returns focuses their interest on the investment risks
that commons take and on common's distribution of assets to itself.
That focus is not on every such risk or distribution, but principally
on risks or distributions that endanger fulfillment of seniors' limited
claims. In short, rationally they have only modest concern with deeply
and pervasively restraining commons' discretion in such matters. On
the other hand, common stock's interest in maximizing residual re-
turns makes it rational to resist fiduciary restrictions (loose or strict)
on its behavior. In that context, basing the limits on common's discre-
tion to self-aggrandize on the specifications in the arrangements be-
tween the parties is feasible for seniors and more acceptable to com-
mons than imposing fiduciary obligations as the limiting mechanism.'"
That process enables the parties to strike a balance that is not as
protective for seniors as would be achieved by fiduciary strictures, but
t 23 The extent to which it is preferable for those constraints to be addressed explicitly (ex
ante) rather than implicitly (ex post) is debatable. See Wayne Eastman & P.V. Viswanath, Implicit
Contracts, Economic Efficiency, and Bondholder-Stockholder Conflict (Nov. 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Boston College Law Review).
The risks that management is expected to take in operating the firm are, at least in theory,
those preferred by common stockholders, not those preferred by management; except as embed-
ded in the terms of its compensation, management has no direct interest in the returns from
those risks. On the other hand, the risks that common stockholders are expected to take vis-a-vis
seniors are those preferred by them, not those preferred by senior investors. Because the two
groups are to share in the returns from those risks, the kind of risks and the mode of sharing
must be specified or defined. Those matters are necessarily left for contract. Adding traditional
fiduciary restrictions on the common stockholders vis-a-vis seniors would be at odds with the
function of their arrangements. See generally Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 122.
Moreover, the structural conflict between management and common stockholders over the
conduct of corporate aft:ars (e.g., management's rational preference for less risk than stockhold-
ers would rationally prefer) is peripheral to the relationship rather than, as with senior security
holders, at the core of it. The efibrt to align management's behavior with stockholder interests
that is the function of fiduciary restraints (i.e., the exclusive benefit principle) cannot be effected
for a relationship in which conflict is at the core.
I " Open-ended fiduciary restrictions may (or may not) hamper management or controllers
in pursuit of value maximization for the common stockholders. That is a risk the latter must bear
in order to protect themselves against management's otherwise uncabined temptation to slack
or to divert assets. Such restrictions on commons vis-a-vis seniors are less necessary for the
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is in theory at least flexible enough to enable seniors to preclude
diversion of assets that threaten their returns.' 25
 While the seniors lack
the cognition and volition in these arrangements that classic contract
would require, the relationship between the parties is closer to that of
conventionally contracting parties than to fiduciaries and beneficiaries.
And if the judicial focus on the problem is adjusted to reflect the
circumstances of the arrangements and the protective purpose of the
mechanism, seniors can indeed be adequately protected.
Other considerations also argue against fiduciary restrictions on
common stock to protect seniors. The notion of "impropriety" in
diverting part of the assets or value of the firm to common stock at the
expense of seniors requires a definition of the "proper share" of each
in the assets or values. The definition is required in part to determine
what constitutes misbehavior, and in part to prescribe the remedy
therefor. As we have seen, in the case of restrictions on management to
protect common stockholders, there is no need to define the "proper
share" because management is not entitled (at least structurally) to any
share. The traditional fiduciary restraint fits with management's lack
of entitlement to share by providing that it may not divert to itself any
interest in the assets or value of the enterprise. But if sharing is the
entitlement, as in the case of common stockholders vis-a-vis seniors,
the fiduciary construct governing managers unravels because it offers
no guide to determining "proper shares." Nor is the equality principle
that offers protection to public common stockholders against control-
ling common stockholders available to seniors. The seniors' claim is to
unequal sharing, not to equality. Hence, any version of the fiduciary
notion leaves one at large on the question of defining and appropri-
ately allocating the shares and the risks entailed in creating enterprise
value.' 26
protection of seniors' limited and prior claims than they are for the protection of commons'
interests vis-a-vis management or controllers.
125
 State-imposed restraints on parties to a contractual non-fiduciary relationship derive Frolil
the need to set limits on the extent to which the parties in their articulated statements have
authorized each to serve himself at the expense of the other. This need arises more because of
uncertainties as to what the parties have thus authorized than from the intrinsic inability of the
beneficiary to specify restrictions, which is at the base of state-imposed fiduciary obligations, To
he sure, some common stockholders' opportunism cannot be anticipated by seniors; but. the
latter's inability so to anticipate is much less than the public common stockholders' inability in
seeking to anticipate managers' or controllers' misbehavior. The only effective solution for the
common stockholders' disability is the fiduciary obligation.
120 cy. Robinson v TI.M.E.-DC Inc., 566 F. Stipp. 1077, 1084-.85 (N.D. Tex. 1983). The
opposition, if not outright conflict, of interests between borrowers and lenders is endemic and
explicit, in contrast to the essentially collateral conflicts between agents and principals or among
partners. To abstract from that reality and characterize all of the relationships as entailing the
same agency costs or fiduciary relationships misses crucial differences.
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Seniors might well prefer the protection of traditional fiduciary
restraints and the exclusive benefit principle for themselves. But ar-
rangements rooted in the endemic conflict between seniors and jun-
iors over risk taking or maximizing and sharing values argue against
resort to such fiduciary restraints. That argument, coupled with the
modestly better case for "contract" as a feasible mode of protecting
seniors' interests than for protecting stockholders against management
or controllers, justifies (if it does not require) avoiding fiduciary re-
strictions and remitting the parties to explicit contractual solutions.
Maximizing enterprise value may better serve society than maxi-
mizing returns to shareholders in circumstances in which decisions to
effect the latter necessarily preclude the former. But if the former is
the aspiration, traditional fiduciary obligations on the commons, based
on the exclusive benefit principle, do not furnish the apparatus for
achieving it. To be sure, insofar as corporate fiduciary loyalty restric-
tions have eroded to require only that transactions be "fair," imposing
such diluted restrictions on commons vis-a-vis seniors may not entail
an unduly costly imposition on either party or on society. But to the
extent that the corporate law fiduciary conception of "fairness" re-
stricts common stock more narrowly than would the good faith or
other requirements of contract law, a higher cost than necessary may
be imposed by invoking even that species of fiduciary doctrine. Possibly
this explains the general, if less than unanimous, judicial disinclination
to impute fiduciary obligations to seniors to common stock.
In any event, if the concept of "fairness" is to govern, it must be
administered, at least in the first instance, by management. Difficult if
not impossible obstacles confront management in the performance of
that task.
2. Obligations of Management to Seniors
If there is little basis for imposing on common stockholders fiduciary
loyalty obligations to seniors in dealing with the enterprise's distribu-
tion or investment policy or capital structure, there is little more basis
for imposing such obligations on management. If the matter is viewed
structurally, and management is seen as the agent (albeit indirect) of
the common stockholders vis-a-vis seniors, management should not
owe to senior security holders fiduciary obligations that preclude it
from favoring common stockholders any more than does its principal.
Similarly, if management is seen as the agent of "the corporation," that
status imposes restraints on management's self-aggrandizing or care-
less behavior. But the case remains to be made as to why in managing
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corporate affairs managers incur fiduciary obligations to the seniors,
or indeed any different obligations than the common stock does in
choosing management or otherwise directing corporate affairs.
The conflict of interest between debt and equity over investment
or distribution policy or capital structure implicates the economic
question of whether the goal of the corporate decision-maker should
be to maximize stockholders' value rather than enterprise (and possi-
bly creditors') value if its decision affects those values differently. Tra-
ditional fiduciary stricture suggests that the proper decision for man-
agement to take is to favor commons' interest, at least until the enterprise
is insolvent' 27 or reaches "the vicinity of insolvency." 128 At that time, or
possibly earlier, it may be necessary and appropriate for the corporate
decision-making body (the board and management) to reconcile the
interests of the competing claims of stockholders and creditors (and
other stakeholders) in maximizing the enterprise's value. If so, that body
127 If current federal bankruptcy reorganization law leaves the debtor in possession, in
contrast to displacing the debtor with a trustee or creditor representatives as did prior bankruptcy
reorganization law, the obligations of management should remain tied to its principal (i.e., the
stockholders whom the law keeps in possession). If fiduciary obligations to creditors are to be
imposed upon management, its loyalty obligation to common stock should be severed by empow-
ering creditors and disempowering stockholders effectively to appoint management, or by having
the court appoint a trustee (as under pre-1978 bankruptcy reorganization law), thus changing
the source of managerial authority—and also presumably the managers. Thus to replace man-
agement of the insolvent debtor does not deny the entitlement of the debtors' common stock to
bargain with creditors through representatives they select. It does, however, align the persons who
are managing the debtor with those whose claims on the debtors' assets have !natured, and pro
&into dominate the common stockholders' claims. But el Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354-56 (1985).
"8 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). In either case, distributive
considerations and the conflicting interests of seniors and common stockholders in that matter
dominate the agenda. Whether in such circumstances management can intelligibly represent
both sets of claimants (or the corporation") in making investment decisions, let alone distributive
decisions, is problematic. Indeed, in the vicinity of insolvency," if not earlier, management's
self-interest [night align its policies in directing corporate affairs more closely to the interests of
debt holders than those of stockholders, In such cases, there may be more need to press for
fulfillment of fiduciary duties to stockholders than to create fiduciary duties to bondhoklers.
Management's obligations should be determined by reference to whose agent it is (i.e. by
which principal appoints it). That this "agency" enables stockholders (having only a "thin" interest
in the assets) to continue to cause risks to be taken at the expense of creditors (now having a
"thick" interest in the assets) is no less an entitlement of their relationship than when the
relationship originated, That the situation may give management the incentive to betray its
beneficiaries and favor the creditors is simply an extension of the problem of assuring an agent's
fidelity. Arguably directors' fiduciary obligations should not shift from stockholders to creditors
until the latter are unequivocally "owners," as presumptively evidenced by the initiation of
bankruptcy or insolVency proceedings. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692
F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir. 1982); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-90 (Del. Ch.
1992); Cnoem, COFFEE & GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 48 (4th ed. 1995).
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should by law (1) be so instructed, and furnished with appropriate
criteria for decision, and (2) be constituted of appropriately weighted
representatives of each class of claimants. The costs of thus requiring
a regime of bargaining at the hoard room table may well be consider-
ably less than the costs of making the same persons arbiters for conflict-
ing interests with accountability to none. So long as the board is
constructed only of representatives of common stock, that constituency
has a claim on its institutional loyalty as fiduciary that is logically prior
to any comparable claim by seniors.
If the fiduciary role is viewed as constraining managerial slack or
diversion of assets to itself, as distinguished from managerial favoring
of the interests of commons over those of seniors, a somewhat different
problem is presented. To the extent that such managerial conduct
renders the corporation unable to meet its contractual obligations to
seniors (e.g., to pay interest or dividends or principal), seniors are
entitled to relief from actual default in meeting those obligations. In
that. process, they may be entitled to assert that management violated
its fiduciary obligations to the common stockholders (who in that
context are equivalent to "the corporation") and, because recovery for
that violation is an asset of "the corporation" which should cushion, if
not be allocated to, the seniors, they should be entitled to pursue it.
But seniors have no claim to receive any of those recovered assets until
their contractual entitlement matures.' 29 The fact that managerial be-
havior so depletes corporate assets as to cause a decline in the prices
of senior securities prior to their maturity gives seniors no more claim
to force corporate action against management than they would have
against common stockholders for directing comparably effective be-
havior. To allow seniors to enforce such claims when prices drop, but
there has been no violation of the contractual obligations of the cor-
Until then, if the creditors' contract does not entitle them to displace stockholders in control, it
is hard to see why directors should become their fiduciaries, and it is impossible to see how
directors can at one time be fiduciaries for both (or all) constituencies, or why they should be.
Cf. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 NIL 277613, at *34; Ann E. Conway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary
Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J.
Coro.. L. 1 (1995).
129 Management's self-aggrandizing behavior or carelessness or "excessive" risk taking, against
which the seniors' contract fails to protect them, arc not thereby excluded from the category of
managerial behavior against which seniors are legally entitled to protection. But that entitlement
addresses behavior only of the kind that would justify stockholder or corporate recovery against
management—in contract or in tort or for violation of fiduciary obligations to them. Seniors'
standing to vindicate that entitlement rests on the resulting default in their contractual right to
be paid rather titan on any direct claim as tort victim or as beneficiary. Compare Saul Levinore,
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and CoiporrW Settings, 92 YALE Li. 49, 80-82 (1082), with
Mitchell, supra note 122, at 1195-1200. If common stockholders decline to pursue their available
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poration or of the common stockholders to them, would interfere with
common stockholders' control of the enterprise in violation of the
essential premises of the arrangements between themm—whether the
issue arises with respect to investment policy, asset management or
corporate structure.
It should also be noted that intractable problems arise if manage-
ment is regarded as having, from whatever source, fiduciary obligations
to both common stockholders and seniors. Although the exclusive
benefit principle precludes management from diverting any corporate
assets or values from the beneficiary to itself, it implicates a broader
premise: management receives its power and concomitant fiduciary
obligation of loyalty for the benefit of the common stock. But that
premise cannot be invoked in deciding how management can or should
meet the competing claims of seniors and juniors if the premise is
transmuted into a fiduciary obligation to both of them.' 31 The same is
true for the principle of equality if the competing claims are to unequal
return (in amount and in priority). In the absence of relevant contract
terms or other instructions, management is left without boundaries set
by the parties or the state, and without the support of any signal from
the fiduciary notion. The "fiduciary" in such circumstances sits at large,
like a Kadi under a tree.
If in theory the fiduciary concept would offer little or nothing to
guide management in allocating risks and shares between seniors and
common stockholders, in practice it might well produce injury to both
remedies against self-serving management, it is hard to see why seniors should he authorized to
pursue management except as their contract so authorizes. Possibly common stockholders' fail u re
to act may be a function of a controlling common stockholder paying off management lOr
non ,
-0:wporate obligations that it owes or otherwise distributing assets to itself as controller. The
propriety of its behavior vis-a-vis senior investors turns on the provisions of their contract. See,
e.g., Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 569 P.2d 875, 880-82 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1977); Rosan v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., No. C1V,A.10526, 1990 WI- 13482, at *6-7 (1)el.
Ch. Feb. 6, 1990).
134) Senior securities that are publicly traded may have a claim to protective rules that limit
COMIlllon' behavior more rigorously than do rules affecting private lenders. When commons alter
the risk or dilute the claims of public seniors they affect current price in the market, not merely
the likelihood of non-payment of current or future obligations to a private investor. Public seniors
may appropriately seek protection against behavior that produces such effects. 11' achieving it by
contract is less effective than achieving it by imputing a fiduciary obligation to the common,
doing the latter is more costly. As we shall see, contract doctrine contains suggestions for more
effective protection.
"I Cf. Robinson, 566 F. Supp. at 1084. The notion that no person can serve two masters rests
in part on the conflicting claims of the two masters and in part on the temptation to yield to
expected favors from one or the other of them. In these respects, management's task is not
comparable to that of a trustee whom the senior created, at least in part, to decide between the
interests of life-tenants and remaindermen. Cf. supra note 14.
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sets of putative beneficiaries. As has been pointed out powerfully in
the literature,'" to give management a role that does not tie it to
common stockholders but obligates it to be "fair" to conflicting claim-
ants is to enable it to play its obligations to one group off against those
to the others. Thus management becomes free to serve its own interests
at the expense of all investors or other stockholders.
3. The Peculiar Problem of Preferred Stockholders
Even if creditor senior security holders should thus look to con-
tract rather than fiduciary notions for protection against common
stock's direction of corporate affairs, preferred stock ("preferreds")
may claim protection under the fiduciary umbrella. Preferred stock
investors, like bondholders, have a claim to a prior but limited return,
in exchange for which they offer funds to be risked at the discretion
of the common stock. And like bondholders, their essential economic
interest is in the return of principal and current distributions, rather
than (as with common stock) with any increased inchoate value of the
assets of the enterprise. But unlike bondholders, preferred stock inves-
tors commit funds to the discretion of commons without limit of time.
Moreover, they have no unconditional contractual entitlement to re-
ceive either dividends or return of principal during the life of the firm,
or during its insolvency.
In the case of debt, during the period before payment of principal
is due, common stockholders have the power to abuse the senior
security holders. But in a continuing enterprise, the need to meet
current payments and to repay or refund principal imposes some
restraint on the common stockholders' use of that power. That implicit
restraint may make judicial vigilance in interpreting the investment
contract a less compelling need for bondholders than for preferred
stockholders.
That the preferred stock is committed to the enterprise without
such payment protection does not overcome the objections to protect-
ing it by imposing fiduciary obligations on common stock or manage-
ment. If such obligations would restrict common's behavior in trans-
actions which the preferred's contract covers more narrowly than the
132 See, e.g., ABA CommirrEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, Other Constituencies' Statutes: Potential
for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990); _pales J. Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes:
An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have Come, 3 INsIGH -rs 20, 24 (1989). But see generally David
Milton, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Patrick J. Ryan, Calculating the
"Stakes" for Corporate Shareholders as Part of Business Decision-Making, 44 RUTGERS L. Raw. 555
(1991). See also supra note 13.
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contract requires, they would, as with bondholders, restrict the discre-
tion of common stockholders incongruously.'" Those restrictions would
be more than is necessary in view of the possibility of contractual
protection for the preferred stockholders that can be sufficiently effec-
tive if the judiciary adopts an appropriately comprehending stance in
interpreting the contract—particularly when the challenged transac-
tion entails involuntary and unnecessary redistribution of values be-
tween the commons and preferreds.
To he sure, the judiciary has not adopted such an interpretive
stance. For more than half a century the courts have systematically, if
not uniformly, upheld the commons' view of the scope of its discretion
to act opportunistically toward the preferred stockholders under the
preferreds' investment contract or the statutes that the contract is said
to incorporate. The courts have left the preferreds without formal
contractual protection from a wide variety of opportunistic behavior
by commons that redistributes values from preferreds to commons—
whether commons' management acts unilaterally or effects preferreds'
consent to apparently unlimitedly disadvantageous alterations of the
contract.'" Although the courts may have sensed that they were creat-
ing problems by thus letting the genie of common stock's discretion
out of the bottle, their efforts to cabin that discretion rarely have gone
beyond formal admonitory statements.
155 This alters the essential premise of the preferred-commons contractual allocations of risk
and return to the residual investor. To the extent that fiduciary restrictions would impose
restraints on commons with respect to asset management or risk and return allocation to them-
selves vis-a-vis the preferreds that are not derivable from the contract, they would alter the
premises of the parties' express allocation of risk, return and control to the residual taker. To be
sure, sonic limit on commons' allocation of risks and returns is required. But., as with bonds, that.
limit is better derived From the structure and terms of' the contract between common and
preferred than by imputation of a fiduciary relationship. See generally Hurst Sc McGuinness, supra
note 122.
There are intimations in the judicial opinions and among commentators that management
owes fiduciary duties to preferreds comparable to those it owes to the commons with respect to
diverting corporate assets to itself. See info notes 135-36; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stork (And Why We Should Care. About It), 51 Bus. LAw. 443 (1996),
preferreds may appropriately claim more protection against such behavior than is
allowed to creditors (who presumably must wait until insolvency to seek to recover a corporate
asset) because they do not have the same claim of a definite due date and entitlement to enforce
failure to pay interest or principal. Thus, arguably they may invoke a more demanding standard
of good faith from common stockholders in such matters than may bondholders. See Robert B.
Robbins and Barton Clark, The Board's Fiduciary Duty to Preferred Stockholders, 7 INsIGHTs, No.
I I, at 18, 21-22 (1993). The matter is complicated fur preferreds with sinking fund covenants
that arc therefore not so indefinitely committed, or possibly for participating preferreds that are
entitled to share in current residual distributions.
134 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARv. L. RE.v. 780 (1942);
E.R. Laity, Fairness—The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. Riw.
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Doctrinally, the limits were sometimes defined by contract inter-
pretation (as in the case of dividends for non-cumulative preferred
stockholders), but more often by reference to conceptions of construc-
tive fraud, illegality, fairness, bad faith or reckless indifference to the
rights of others.'" Only recently has the discourse of fiduciary duties
appeared as the doctrinal predicate for imposing limitations on com-
mons' discretion—but with no more success than the other conclusory
formulae in delineating commons' prohibited behavior. 136 Nothing
that courts have done during the last six decades alters the import of
the description in 1937 of preferred stockholders as being regularly
"euchered, cajoled, coerced, elbowed and traded out of their legal
rights" by the commons."? The judiciary's systematic reluctance to
(1942); Victor Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1978); see also, Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1988);
Kirschner Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Natomas Co., 229 Gal. Rptr. 899, 903-09 (Ct. App. 1986); Rothschild
Intl Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136-37 (Del. 1984); H.B. Korenvaes Inv, L.P. v.
Marriott Corp., 1993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,728 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993); Hesston Corp.
v. Kays, 870 P.2d 17, 37-41 (Kan. 1994); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 93-94 (R.I.
1969).
Courts vest commons' directors with virtually non-reviewable discretion to refrain temp
paying dividends to preferreds, which operates particularly harshly on non-cumulative preferred.
Compare Sanders v. Cuba R.R., 120 A.2d 849, 850-52 (NJ. 1956), with Gutttnann v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 189 F.2d 927, 928-31 (2d Cir. 1951).
"5 See, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 199 n.2, 201 (D. Del. 1943),
affd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1994); Purges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. Ch. 1943);
Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (III 1959); Zobel v. American Locomotive Co.. 44
N.Y.S.2d 33, 37 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Note, Limitations on Alteration of Shareholders' Rights by Charter
Amendment, 69 HAM'. I.. REv. 538, 544 (1956). The occasional case that permits preferred
standing to bring derivative actions may rest on the premise of fiduciary obligation. See Lowell
Wiper Supply Co. v. The Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lewis v. Great
Western Corp., No. CIV.A 5397, 1977 WL 2574, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 1977); David" Greene
& Co. v. Sehenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
13( ' See, e.g., Robinson, 566 F. Stipp. at 1084; Kirschner Bros., 229 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03 (rejecting
fiduciary obligations on facts of case); Security Nat'l Bank, 569 P.2d at 881; H.B. Korenvaes Inv.
L.I'. v. Marriott Corp., 1993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,728 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993); Glinert v.
Wickes Co., 586 A.2d 1201 (Del. Supr, 1990); Rosati v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., No.
C1V.A.10526, 1990 WL 13482, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1990); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels. Inc..
509 A.2d 584, 599-95 (Del. Ch. 1986); Dalton v. American Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574, 582-85 (Del.
Ch.), affd, 501 A.2d 1238 (Del. 1985); Hesston Corp., 870 P.2d at 43-46. But cf. In re FLS Holdings,
Inc., No. CIV.A.12623, 1993 WI, 104562, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Ape 2, 1993); Eisenberg v. Chicago
Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1058-61 (Del. Ch. 1987) (involving disclosure obligations); Dart.
v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., No. 7366, 1985 WL 11500, ai *1 (Del. Ch. June '25, 1985).
The cases offer little help in defining how, or in what proportions or amounts, the fiduciary
obligation would allocate benefits between the commons and the prcferreds.
For equally ineffectual (arid theoretically problematic) references to fiduciary obligations of
preferred to common, see Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 660 (1)el. Ch.
1975). Cf. Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 919-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But cf. Orban
Field, No. CIVA.12820, 1993 -1,471., 547187, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1993).
157 1n re International Paper & Power Co., 2 SEC Reports 1004, 1023-24 (1937). Fur a
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protect preferred stockholders in interpreting their contracts does not
mean that the fiduciary mantle is more appropriate or protective or
that contract doctrine does not offer more supportive approaches.
The fiduciary notion is apparently invoked on the theory that,
since preferred stock is "stock," preferred stockholders, like common
stockholders, are "owners" of the enterprise. Therefore, controllers
(management or controlling stockholders) owe fiduciary obligations
to holders of preferred stock as to holders of common stock. Hence,
at least in matters not "covered" by the contract, management (effec-
tively the common stock) should be required to act as fiduciaries on
behalf of the preferred stockholders and, pro Canto, yield at least some
of the common stockholders' economic aspirations to the preferred
stockholders.'" The more formal doctrinal suggestion is that matters
not covered by the preferred stock contract be treated as matters
with respect to which the preferred stockholders enjoy "rights shared
equally with the common."'" In some way that is not entirely clear,
"equality" is thought to entitle the preferred stockholders' interests to
the same consideration by the common stockholders' managerial rep-
resentatives in initiating or performing transactions with redistributive
effects as they owe to the common stockholders' interests. 14°
But the essence of the arrangements between preferred and com-
mon stock is limiting and prioritizing the income and asset entitle-
ments of the former and allocating the residual interest and control
description and analysis of the unhappy plight of public investors in preferred stock and the
doctrinal tangle in which those rights are ensnarled, see Mitchell, supra note 133.
138 Mitchell suggests that fiduciary obligations occasionally are (and should be) invoked to
restrain opportunistic behavior that the contract is interpreted to permit, or at least not to
prohibit. See Mitchell, supra note 133, at 958-62. But even proponents of the notion that
preferreds and commons "share" rights, see feduiab, 509 A.2d at 594-95, must acknowledge how
ephemeral such a "shared" right—and any resulting putative fiduciary obligation to preferred—
may be. See infra note 144.
1 " See Jedwah, 509 A.2d at 594-95. The venerable adage that all shares of stock are equal"
unless preferences or other attributes are expressed "in clear language," Rotimr S. STEVENS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 469 (1949), rests uneasily beside contradic-
tory and more recent notions that preferred stocks' central attributes are a function of contract,
see St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. v. Loeb, 318 S.W.2d 246, 252-63 (Mo. 1958) (en bane); Squires
v. Balbach Co., 129 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Neb. 1964); see also HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE,
RALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 506-99 (1946), and that the statutory provisions applicable to
preferred stuck are incorporated in the contract. Cf Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d
89, 93-94 (R.I. 1969).
The unlimited duration of the preferred stockholders' capital commitment may account for
statutory provisions such as those that mandate their power to inspect books and records or to
vote by class in certain circumstances. lint such provisions arc not a predicate for assimilating
pref'erred stockholders to common stockholders or converting a relationship between them that
is functionally one of conflicting interests into a fiduciary relationship.
14° See supra notes 138 and 139.
652	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:595
to the latter. The explicit provisions of the typical preferred stock
contract thus allocate returns and voting power so as to bring preferred
stockholders much closer to the position of bondholders than of "own-
ers." As we have seen in the case of bondholders, restricting the com-
mon stockholders' opportunistic behavior by reference to the restric-
tions contemplated by the traditional fiduciary notion is at odds with
the parties' core arrangements."'
The terms of the relationship between the preferreds and com-
mons, other than the terms allocating returns and control, are de-
signed to protect those core provisions for the parties. If there is any
matter not covered by the contract (or a provision in the contract
Seems inconsistent with realization of specified preferences or voting
powers), it seems reasonable to treat the problem as a gap or ambiguity
in the terms of the contract that serve to protect the parties' core
relationship—just as the terms governing protection and privileges of
holders of warrants and convertibles are treated by courts faced with
such gaps or ambiguities."' Contract law, which is concerned in part
with restricting the power of one party to engage in opportunistic
conduct at the expense of the other, offers the appropriate source for
determining the limits of the commons' expropriative conduct. 14"
In that function, contract doctrine may be formally comparable
to fiduciary doctrine. But, as we have seen, the two sets of doctrine do
not prescribe the same limits, even if fiduciary doctrine is viewed in its
current flexible form with respect to restrictions on corporate manag-
ers or controllers, and contract doctrine is viewed in its more flexible
rather than its classical form. Courts have been grudging, if not hostile,
141 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. The attempted "completeness" of the
express provisions of the seniors' contract in matters of control and sharing, however flawed,
differs from the substantial "incompleteness" effected in such matters by the "contract" relation-
ship between management or controllers and public conimon stockholders that requires fiduciary
protection for the latter.
That fiduciary notions are inappropriate to protect seniors against redistribution to control-
hug common stockholders, or against management acting as agent for common stock, need not
make it inappropriate to limit managers' self-serving behavior at the expense of both common
and preferred, if. supra note 129, as may occur when management diverts assets to itself, as in
management buy-outs of enterprises in which management owns little or no stock. See fed web.
509 A.2d at 595-95. Compare Dart, 1985 V41 21145, at *4-5, with Eisenberg, 537 A.2d at 1051 (in
which management's only gain was as holders of common stock).
145 See Brenton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 122, at 691-98; Bratton, Interpretation of Con-
tracts, supra note 122, at 373-83.
143 Thus, for example, the preferred stock contract is often construed to incorporate statutory
provisions that give the commons the option to choose one form of merger or amalgamation
rather than another, and thereby to alter or circumvent express distributive entitlements of the
preferred provided in the document. Or the contract is construed to permit transactions that
effect distributions to the commons and leave the preferreds as claimants in a shell enterprise,
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to the contract-based notions of "good faith" or "unconscionability" as
doctrinal signals to limit opportunistic behavior by common stockhold-
ers in such matters—whether the question is seen as interpreting the
contract to permit (or prohibit) the common stockholders' behavior
or as setting limits on the discretion to allocate the proceeds of trans-
actions that are found to be permitted. The recent ambiguous allusions
to fiduciary flavoring in the process"' have not brought any more
analytic light, or any economic solace, to preferred stockholder victims
of common stockholders' opportunism. If that opportunism is to be re-
stricted, then notwithstanding other voices,TM 5
 it is theoretically sounder
and well may be more feasible to attempt to do so by reference to
nascent contract doctrine.
B. Contractual Obligations To Senior Security Holders
The limited ability of dispersed seniors to bargain and engage in
effective contracting to restrict the discretion necessarily vested in the
common (and its management) may not be sufficient to overcome the
objections to imposing fiduciary limitations on commons' power to
engage in opportunistic behavior toward seniors. But to conclude that
common stockholders have neither a fiduciary relationship nor its
obligations to public senior investors is not to say that the contractual
world in which they relate should not take account of the difference
between the actual informed consent of a sole actor and the more or
less conscripted consent of public senior investors. The failure of
or in an enterprise that is highly leveraged with increased debt. There is good reason to believe
that circumvention of the distributive entitlements of the preferreds should thus be forbidden as
a matter of contract interpretation unless more or less expressly authorized or signaled, 'Fhe
question is also raised whether the proceeds of such redistributive transactions have been appro-
priately allocated between the common and the preferred whose distributive entitlements have
been evaded by the transaction thus permitted. If the "contract .' is thus interpreted to leave the
common stock with discretion to divide the proceeds, fiduciary obligations are as incongruous
as the source of restrictions on common stock's discretion in making the division as they are with
respect to dividend payments,
The discretion of the Board, generally elected by the commons, to pay dividends to the
preferred is rarely (if' ever) restrictable by fiduciary obligations; and even though limits derived
from conceptions of good faith or unconscionability are looser, they seem rarely to have been
invoked. See supra notes 134-35.
t44 See In re FLS Holdings, Inc., 1993 WL 104562, at *4-5; compare H.R. Korenvaes, 1993 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,443. of Security Nat'l Bank, 569 P.2d at 880-81. Compare Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42-43 (3d Cir. 1947), with Speed v. 'Fransamerica Corp., 235
F.2d 369, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1956).
145 A discerning analysis of the incongruity of the preferred stockholders' position that sees
a rote For the diluted corporate fiduciary doctrine in solving the preferreds' dilemma is ofkred
by Mitchell, who also offers a substantive solution, See Mitchell, supra note 133.
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public seniors' contracts to forbid kinds of opportunistic behavior by
commons that private seniors' contracts prohibit should not be taken
as consent to such behavior. Considerations both of equity and efficiency
suggest that commons' power to initiate redistributive transactions
under the public seniors' investment contracts should be limited, ex-
cept as the instrument expressly authorizes (or at least its selling
literature affirmatively signals) the possibility of such opportunistic
behavior. Seniors should not be required to bear the risk of all oppor-
tunistic behavior by the commons that is not expressly prohibited.
1. General Considerations
The public senior security investors have the least role of any
participants in negotiating or prescribing the terms of the bargain.
They have no power directly—and little power indirectly—to negotiate
adequate protection by reference to specific conduct or generalized
risks. Unlike the issuer, the underwriter or the indenture trustee,
public senior security investors do not participate in the bargaining
process; they are faced with a "take it or leave it" offer. Moreover, they
are the least likely of any of the participants to know or understand
the redistributive conduct or risks against which protective covenants
are designed to protect, or the terms of the arrangements addressed
to such risks. They rationally do not read the indenture or corporate
charter, and rarely do, or are able to, parse the prospectus for the
meaning of any protective covenants (or their absence) or the risks of
possible opportunistic behavior. Therefore, they are likely to receive
protective terms less favorable than would a sole lender or private
investor who negotiates with the issuer, seeks relevant information
from the issuer, and does not suffer from rational apathy.' 46 Notwith-
standing argument to the contrary, there is reason to believe that the
market in such securities functions considerably less than perfectly to
reflect bondholders' consent to the presence or absence of many risks
of opportunistic behavior by the common stockholders, and protective
covenants to offset them.' 47
146 See, e.g., Martin Riger, The Trust Indenture as Bargained Contract: The Persistence of Myth,
16J. CORP. L. 211,215-19 (1991); Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private vs. Public Lending:
Evidence from Covenants (Feb. 1995) (unpublished discussion paper no. 151, on file with the
Boston College Law Review). Functionally and culturally the underwriter is even less suitable to
bring the initial consent of dispersed senior investors to the table than is the board of directors
to carry the consent of dispersed stockholders either initially or in medics. Nor does the indenture
trustee's interest coincide adequately with bondholders' interests.
147 Certainly the bond market offers a very poor substitute for consent to assume such risks,
particularly for non-investment grade bonds. See, e.g., Swill) 1)atta et al., The Pricing of
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As among the parties, therefore, the public investors are the per-
sons least able to protect themselves against the risks that protective
covenants are designed to avert. The issuer is the party which the
arrangements leave with the widest discretion to act opportunistically.
As between the two, equity (on the assumption of a normative prefer-
ence for informed free choice by contracting parties) calls for the
issuer to bear the burden of negating ambiguities or gaps in the
contract that might permit injurious consequences to the investor from
the issuer's opportunistic behavior.
Quite apart from considerations of equity, considerations of effi-
ciency argue for the same judicial stance. Uncertainty about the mean-
ing of a security contract raises the cost of capital, both when the
security is first issued to an investor, and later in its impact on price in
secondary trading. It is in the interests of society for the ambiguities
and gaps in the meaning of securities contracts to be minimized. A
rule favoring public senior investors by resolving ambiguities or filling
gaps to allocate redistributive risks to the issuer will give the only active
parties in the process who can reduce the uncertainties (the issuer and
the underwriter) the incentive to minimize them. Since they, rather
than public investors, control the drafting of the investment contract,
any excessive rigor in a process that allocates interpretive risks to them
can be avoided in the next generation of contracts—an avoidance
process that is not as likely to be available to public investors." 8
To be sure, putting interpretive risks on the issuer, even though
the issuer may reduce many of them by adequate advance disclosure,
will inhibit the issuer's behavior in ways that may increase its cost of
doing business and discourage it from engaging in riskier behavior that
may be socially optimal. But increasing the cost to issuers of access to
public lenders does not deprive them of access to private lenders or
public subscribers to common equity. The question is whether—or to
Public Offers of Corporate Straight Debt, 52 j. FIN. 379 (1906). Notwithstanding ingenious theoreti-
cal models to price protective covenants, the market is less than perfect. in translating the
covenants into price equivalents. Compare Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor
Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1849-52 (1992), and john C.
Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt
Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Cm. L. REV, 1207, 1217-20 (1091), with Marcel Kahan,
The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Thrms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 565 (1995).
148 This is not to deny that in a variety of situations modificatimB are made in public bond
issues to offset the effects of judicial interpretations that adversely (sometimes quite surprisingly)
affect the public investor. See Marcel Kahan, Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 147, 160-61 (1995) (showing amendment in next generation of public
senior contracts to cover specilied leverage increases or control events); Richard A. Steinwu•izel
and Janice L. Gardner, Super Poison Puts as Protection Against Event Risks, 3 INsicfrits, Oct. 1989,
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what extent—the increased price that the public senior investor should
rationally charge for capital (if he understands the risks of opportun-
istic conduct that he bears under current rules) will impose a greater
cost than the cost resulting from the issuer's inability to maximize in
the event that the possibilities for such conduct are narrowed. As an
abstract matter, because the issuer knows more and can learn more
about those uncertainties less expensively than the public investor,
even if by definition many of those uncertainties are unforeseen, the
least cost avoider would seem to be the issuer. Moreover, to put the
burden on the issuer limits the cost of loss of some value-increasing
transactions by some issuers. But putting the risk on senior investors
implicates increased cost of all senior capital, even for issuers who are
unlikely to need, or resort to, opportunistic behavior.
Thus to shift the judicial stance does not require the interpretive
process to immunize the public senior investor from exposure to all
risks created by gaps or ambiguities in the investment contract. But it
does bring the public senior investor closer to the protection obtained
by the private senior investor, whose knowledgeable and volitional
contract with the issuer suggests the optimum allocation of such risks
that a free market offers.' 49 All other things being equal, there is little
reason to leave issuers free to avoid restrictions that would benefit
dispersed senior buyers or lenders and that sole senior buyers or
lenders would impose. Issuers should not be entitled to take more risks
with public senior money than with private senior money unless public
investors knowingly acquiesce.
at 3,3- 1'2; see also William A. Klein et al., The Call Provision of Corporate Bonds: A Standard Form
in Need of Change, 18 J. CORP. L. 653,665-68 (1993) (discussing "make whole" clauses proposed
for contracts to overcome decisions on refunding at lower interest rates). But cf. F. John Stark,
III et al., "Marriott Risk": A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondholders
to Stockholders, 1994 Cotust Bus. L. REv. 503,577-83 (1996).
Such ex post modifications to protect senior public investors against judicially permitted
commons' opportunism may constitute evidence of the public investors' prior expectations, and
pm (onto suggest that the prior action by commons lacked good faith.
' 49 Sole lenders may impose more restraints on common stock's efforts to maximize values
than do "the capital markets" (i.e. public senior investors), and to that extent may impede
appropriate risk taking and corporate wealth maximization. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1995). On that assumption, which is not entirely
consistent with borrowers' apparent willingness to pay higher interest rates to private lenders,
bringing the protective powers of public senior investors closer to those of private senior investors
may be counter-productive. But an efficient allocation of risks and returns between senior and
junior capital requires knowledgeable, free choice in setting the terms of their relationship. Those
conditions are not available without advance signals to public senior investors of possible oppor-
tunism against which private senior investors guard. To the extent that the market does not, and
can not, adequately digest and reflect such signals, and common stock thereby acquires larger
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But it is argued that all other things are not equal. Issuers are said
to be better able to renegotiate terms with private senior investors than
with public senior investors, and therefore are able to accept restrictive
covenants from the former that would be costlier to renegotiate with
the latter. Issuers undoubtedly incur transaction costs in modifying
contracts with public investors that they would not encounter in deal-
ing with private investors. Moreover, there are holdout risks to issuers
seeking to reduce the principal payment obligations of public debt.
But apart from the possible disadvantage in seeking to effect reduction
of principal amount, (to which private investors are not likely to agree
except at other costs to the issuer) there is little reason to believe that
the relative favorability of terms renegotiated with public investors over
those with private investors will be any less than the relative favorability
of the original terms negotiated with each of them. The avoidance of
transaction costs from renegotiating with public investors must be
offset by the cost to the debtor of the bargaining advantages of private
investors that are equally present for renegotiation as they are for
original issuance.
Nor can a case be made for public seniors receiving less protection
than private seniors because the former can diversify better than the
latter, or have more liquid investments. The benefits of diversification
of risk of opportunism for senior public investors are not as great as
the benefits of diversification of economic risk for public common
stock investors. 150
 Moreover, at least as against risks of opportunism by
the issuer, the advantages of diversification do not offer as much
protection for public senior investors as the more modest diversifica-
tion possibilities combined with the ability to negotiate protective
terms offer for private senior investors. And while it may be argued
that a premium should be paid by public seniors for the advantage
discretion to make value-increasing decisions from dispersed public senior investors than it gets
From private investors, it does so at the cost of exposing the former to opportunistic behavior
that the latter is able to forbid or charge for, and does not compensate therefor. That financing
enterprise by resort to public markets may sometimes be more efficient for a society or closer to
social optimality than resort solely to private financing does not mean that importing monitoring
attributes of the latter would not improve the former. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate
Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996);
Ronald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:
Banks versus Stock Markets (1996) (manuscript, on file with Boston College Law Review).
lw Diversification against the risks of opportunistic behavior by buying bonds of other
companies is problematic because all common stuck of all corporations is likely to act opportu-
nistically. And in any event it is considerably less feasible than is diversification against. the risks
of the run ur the mill economic variables, if only because the latter risks are not within the control
of the other party and its lawyers. Moreover, even in terms of economic variables, diversification
in bond investments merely spreads the downside risk, but does not offer compensatory upside
(158	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:595
they enjoy in the liquidity which private senior investors do not have,
the strength of the case must be assessed against the significant liquid-
ity that most private senior investors (e.g., institutions) enjoy for their
investments.'"
Finally, there is no evidence that the public senior investors know-
ingly acquiesce in the risks that they take—but that private senior
investors do not take—and there is reason to believe that public senior
investors do not know of their disadvantages as compared with private
investors. Some evidence suggesting public acquiescence in the risks
that they take might be the relative interest charges of public and
private senior investors. But that evidence points against public sen-
ior investors' acquiescence in greater risks. Typically, private lenders
charge higher interest rates than do public seniors, notwithstanding
their insistence on protective covenants.' 52 The earning streams of
enterprises that finance by resorting to sole lenders may systematically
be riskier than those of enterprises resorting to public bond markets.
That, as well as issuer dealing preferences and the need to compensate
for illiquidity, may account for the systematically higher interest rates
for private loans, notwithstanding the significant protective covenants
that those loans contain but public bonds do not. On the other hand,
the difference in interest rates may be attributable more to the system-
atic bargaining and information disadvantages of holders of public
debt compared to holders of private debt than to liquidity, risk differ-
ences, or issuer dealing preferences. in that case, the difference be-
tween interest rates in the two markets may reflect an inefficiency that
can be lessened by legal rules that enhance the protection offered to
public debt. Whether such rules would raise interest rates that the
public seniors charge or impose unnecessary costs on borrowers are
unexplored empirical questions)" But leveling the playing field for
gain as does diversification of stock investments. Investing in stocks of companies whose bonds
they buy (or of other companies) offers investors diversification by taking investment risks they
do tiol want, in part in order to benefit from commons' manipulation at the expense of other
creditors.
151 The disparity in costs of illiquidity for private and public investors in stock is nut likely to
be as great for investors in debt. See generally Francis A. Longstaff, How Much Can Marketability
Affect Security Values?, 50 1 FIN. 1767 (1995). The risks are so different, and privately acquired
debt is not likely to be as unmarketable as privately acquired stock, particularly in view of the
easy availability of shelf-registration of debt.
152 See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MEN- ERs, PRINCIPI,ES or CORPORATE Ftr4ANer;
354-56 (4th ed. 1991); Kahan & Tucktnan, supra note 146. To the extent that protective covenants
have value, they should reduce interest rates if present and increase them if absent, uteri's parilms.
1 " See Brudney, supra note 147, at 1825-27; cf. Steven L. Schwartz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994). There is reason to believe that under die
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public investors should, in a rational world, enhance efficiency, and in
a less than rational world, enhance equity.
The development of contract doctrines to effect comparable pro-
tection for dispersed consumers (who cannot and rationally do not
bargain over many terms that protect sellers) is said to impose costs
on consumers and society that may more than offset the benefits of
the interventions thus effected.'" But in the case of senior security
holders, the consequences are not quite the same as for consumers.' 55
Public investors have a measure of revealed preference for price con-
cessions over protective provisions that is not available for dispersed
consumers in connection with most other standard form contracts.
The protective provisions appearing in contracts between an issuer and
a sole lender (or a small group of private purchasers of the entire issue
of bonds or preferred stock) offer clues as to the preferences for
protection at the cost of price asserted by informed sophisticated
investors. They also offer some measure of appropriate adjustment of
the total terms and price thought preferable by informed transactors
who have freedom to agree to those terms.
Possibly, interpretive standards that bring the posture of dispersed
senior investors closer to that of a sole investor will result in net
increase in the cost of public senior capital to entrepreneurs. At the
present interpretive regime common stock's attempts to expropriate wealth from public seniors
by opportunistic behavior arc nut infequent, particularly when the enterprise's value has con-
tracted. See, e.g., Stark et al., supra note 148, at 523-28.
154 Thus the limits imposed by doctrines such as unconscionability Or good frith on consum-
ers' choices might reduce the cost savings from standard form contracts and might—or 'night
not—cause sellers to increase prices. It is also urged that such doctrines deny to some consumers
a preference between price concessions and assorted protective provisions or might otherwise
impose waste upon the society. See. Michael J. Trebilcock, An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, in STUDIES IN Commix:1 . LAW 381,414-17 (Barry" Reiter & John Swan eds.,
1980); Michael]. Trehilcock & Donald M. Dewees, Judicial Control qf Standard Form Contracts, in
THE Econormc APPROACH TO LAW 93 (P. Rurrows and C. Veljanovski, eds., 1081); see also, Richard
Croswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distrilmtion in Buyer-Seller Relationships,
43 STAN. L. REV. 301 (1991). But compare Avery Katz, Your Thrms or Mine? The Duty to Read the
Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND J. or: L. AND ECON. 518 (1990). Those conclusions are not
self-evident in theory, and are subject to resolution of as yet unanswered empirical questions.
'"Investors in bonds and preferred stocks, particularly institutional investors, may not have
the same claims to bargaining inequality and information asymmetry or need for protection as
do consumers tinder standard contracts dealing with insurance or utilities or consumer goods
generally. Cf. Eric Posner, Contract Law and the Welfare State, 24 J. or,
 LEGAL &Rums 283 (1095).
However, in the amendment or merger process, the paralysis implicit in the need for collective
action (even when their choice is not otherwise "coerced") makes their trammeled choices
comparable; and in the interpretive process, experience suggests that senior securities holders
are sufficiently disadvantaged, both procedurally and substantively, to bring the problem within
the reach of considerations underlying doctrines of adhesion, unconscionahility arid good fait h .
cf. Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 251-54.
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margin some value-increasing projects may be lost.' 56 But there is no
ready way to calculate the socially optimal equilibrium between the
issuer's cost and the senior investors' risk if the latter systematically lack
adequate information or bargaining power to exercise the free choice
that a sole lender or private investor would exercise.'" Certainly, under
interpretive standards that tend to induce common stockholders to
give public seniors more intelligible and freer choice in allowing com-
mon stockholders discretion, seniors and society are likely to be better
off. Seniors' exposure to the risk of opportunism, in potential readjust-
ments or otherwise, will be more rationally reflected in the cost. of
senior capital than the otherwise unchecked market is able to effect.
2. Standards and Rules for Allocating Risk of Opportunism
To urge such risk allocation is not to require risks of all redistribu-
tive behavior by common stock that injures public seniors to be borne
by the former. Some behavior with redistributive consequences also
enhances the enterprise's value in a manner that can fairly be said to
reflect the appropriate—and contemplated—allocation of risks and
returns between the parties. Private senior investment contracts gen-
erally contain tradeoffs for allocation of many such risks. The problem
remains of fashioning viable standards and rules for protection of
public senior investors against risks that they do not, and structurally
cannot, similarly trade off. That such protection may be sought in
newly minted contract provisions after adverse judicial decisions does
not compensate the prior losers. Nor does a judicial stance that more
or less regularly permits opportunistic behavior by commons offer
protection to transactors in new bonds against new forms of oppor-
tunism.'"8
1 • 6 Costs nay well be imposed upon seniors and society if commons fail to initiate readjust-
ments because they fear that more demanding standards would cause courts to set intolerably
low limits on commons' receipt from the readjustment. Possibly those costs would be higher than
the costs resulting from the present low level of judicial monitoring of indeterminate standards.
Ex ante fears about the tolerability of "sole lender" and "fairness" standards would not deter the
commons from initiating some, perhaps most, readjusunents. Requiring them to act in the
shadow of more demanding standards and monitoring, however, might deter some readjustments
at the margin.
L57 Measuring the cost of deterrence of possible value-increasing transactions at the margin
requires inquiry into how large that margin is, and how many of the enterprises whose readjust-
ment is thus deterred would be worse off without readjustment, or indeed should better be in
insolvency reorganization or liquidation than readjusted.
158 To be sure, there has been a steady erosion of protective covenants in publicly-issued debt
securities of so-called investment grade. Possibly that is the consequence of "rational choice" by
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Exploring potential standards and rules and specifying remedies
for failure to satisfy them require a separate inquiry. Seeds for devel-
oping them may be found in contract doctrines like duress or good
faith, 159
 or unconscionability' 6° and the attendant conception of "fair-
ness.""u As we have seen, those doctrines rest on different premises
that produce different results than would fiduciary doctrine. They
should offer less protection for seniors against opportunism by corn-
investors, See Eastman & Viswanath, supra note 123. But, fin .
 a considerable volume of debt
securities, private investors still demand protective covenants that public investors seem to be
powerless to obtain—possibly because underwriters either cannot, or find it unprofitable to,
obtain them. See Stark et al., supra note 148, at 549-58.
159 See supra note 101. Invocation of the flexible "good faith" requirement would permit
appropriate distinction to be made between, for example, (a) mergers or readjustments that are
purely internal redistributions, see Opelka v. Quincy Mewl Bridge Co., 82 N.E.2d 184, 191 (111.
App. Ct. 1948); Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 25 S.E.2d 363, 37ti-77 (Va. 1943), in which there
is every reason to discourage value transfers among the issuer's security holders, and transactions
that are purchases or acquisitions by third parties (in which there may he reason to permit. such
value transfers), ,see Goldman v. Postal-Tele., Inc., 52 E Supp. 763, 767-70 (1). Del. 1943), (b)
prosperous and faltering enterprises; (c) institutional senior investors and individual senior
investors; or (6) holders of straight debt and holders of convertibles.
miThe notion of unconscionability suggests procedural, as well as substantive, limits on the
amendments effected by parties with such structurally disparate capacities to exercise judgment
and make choices. Those considerations preclude conduct or enforcement of provisions which
a "dependent" party can fairly be said not to have reasonably expected or given free and informed
consent to, such as prejudicial amendments to which sole lenders would not be likely to have
consented or the absence of protective covenants whose availability public investors reasonably
could not know. Applicability of the unconscionability or bad faith notion, or even the concept
of adhesion, is not precluded merely because the problem sterns from the absence of explicit
statement of implicit protective provisions for the investor rather than the obscured presence of
exculpatory provisions for the corporation. See Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 251-54; Timothy j.
Muris, Opportunistic keitavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981) (discussing
limits on contract modification).
tit Titus, in contrast to the proportionate sharing that fiduciary principle requires of con-
trollers vis-a-vis other common stockholders (e.g., in sharing merger gains), good faith embodies
a different concept of fairness of result fur public seniors vis-a-vis common stockholders (e.g., in
sharing losses in recapitalizations). Bankruptcy imposes its own maturing impact on the measure
of seniors' claims and its own concept of ...fairness" on the limits of any rebargain of those claims.
Short of bankruptcy, the concept of "fairness" of common stockholders initiated rcbargains with
seniors can be given content by requiring their "get" to equal not less than their "give." The
seniors' "give" may appropriately be valued by adaptation of SEC interpretations under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. See 15 U.S.C. 79 (1994 & Supp. 11995); In re Eastern
Gas & Fuel Assoc., Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 Release No. 35-9633, 30 S.E.C.
834 (Feb. 3, 1950); Note, A Standard of Fairness Jim Compensating Preferred Shareholder in Corporate
Recapitalization, 33 U. Cm. L. REY. 97 (1965). Common stockholders' "give" can be valued as an
option to buy the enterprise from seniors at, their principal claim (using Black-Scholes tech-
niques) with the duration of the option determined by the imminence of the matuHng of that
claim. The value of the entire enterprise sets limits on the sum of the values of the two "gives."
For different conceptions of "fairness" fur preferred stock, see supra note 134.
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mons than would traditional fiduciary obligations, 162 and probably less
than is (and certainly less than should be) offered by current diluted
corporate fiduciary obligations. But if properly applied, 163 those doc-
trines would check the dramatic opportunism that prevailing case law
permits.'" To fashion useful standards or rules from indeterminate
notions like good faith or unconscionability is not an impossible task,' 65
'2 For example in sharing, rather than being excluded front, gains. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 89-103; see also supra notes 117, i42.
163 T0 proclaim, as courts often do, that "good faith" cannot be used to create, rather than to
protect, "fruits" of the contract that the plaintiff claims to be denied by the defendant's oppor-
tunistic conduct begs the question. By what criteria should courts determine the "fruits" that the
contract provides? A focus on the basic objectives sought by the lenders in the explicit provisions
of the contract would suggest more "fruits" to be protected than does a focus on all the
opportunistic possibilities that the contract's terms could be construed to permit or to bit
expressly to prohibit. The latter focus invites parsing all those possibilities and finding a failure
to protect explicitly against a particular act by the debtor to preclude a court from offering such
protection because it would be "creating," not merely "protecting" fruits. The former focus
appropriately would have produced different results than the courts reached in the cases like the
refunding cases, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, 570 F. Stipp. 1529,
1542-43 (S.D.N.V. 1983), and possibly the spin-off cases, e.g., Marriott bond cases discussed in
Stark et al., ,supra note 148 and Robert R. Parion, Spin-Offs and Wealth Transfers: The Marriott
Case, 43 j, FIN. ECON. 241 (1997), if not the Marriott preferred stock case reported in H.B.
Korenvacs Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,773 (Del. Ch. July
1, 1993). It appropriately would not have produced different results in leveraged buyouts like
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 716 F Supp. 1504, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated
by 906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990) or Pittelman v. Pearce, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, 363-66 (Ct. App. 1992).
On the other hand, it would have had impact in cases like Geren v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 832
F. Supp. 728, 731-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
i• Typical preferred stock cases and debt cases appear to offer even less protection fOr public
seniors (who, by definition, have fully performed their part of the bargain) than do cases involving
commercial contracts for individual transactors (who may not have fully performed at the time
of the other party's opportunistic thrust) or dispersed transactors like consumers. Compare the
results in cases like Broad v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981); Gardner &
Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 E Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (convertibles);
Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Nos. crv.A. 8700, 8701, 8711, 1986 WI. 13008 (Del. Ch.), appeal
denied, 518 A.2d 983 (Del. 1986); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986) with the
doctrine in cases involving commercial transactions discussed in FARNSWORTH, supra note 80,
§§ 4,26–.28; E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in Goon FAITH AND FAULT
IN CONTRACT LAW 153 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); Todd D. Rakoff, The
Implied Terms of Contracts: Of "Default Rules" and "Situation-Sense," in GOOD FAITH ANI) FAULT
IN CONTRACT LAW, supra, at 191; see also, Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining
the Principle, 9 Loy. U. OH. L.J. 765, 771 -75, 798 (1973); Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications
Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine rd Economic Duress, 64 Iowa L. REv. 849 (1979); Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor's New Clothes, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
""'"Thus the teaching of the doctrine of duress should support a conception of good faith
that categorically prohibits some forms of strategic behavior by common stockholders. For
example, common stockholders' resort to contrived choices (that could not possibly be offered
to a sole investor) that pressure dispersed public senior investors to consent to disadvantageous
alterations of their contract by leaving them worse off after the amendment they wish to reject
than they were prior to its acceptance. The common stockholders thus deny to public seniors the
July 1997]	 COW/MGT ANL) FIDUCIARY DUTY	 663
even though it entails difficulties that cannot always be met entirely
satisfactorily.' 66
 This does not make the task avoidable; nor are the
process and its results likely to be more costly than the present inter-
pretive regime."'7
CONCLUSION
Conventional contract doctrine entails a substantially different
analytic framework and normative import than does traditional fiduciary
doctrine in defining the loyalty obligations of the participants and their
freedom of choice that is implicit in their entitlement—by contract or by statute—to vote on
amendments or mergers or recapitalizations (as in Katz and Kass). For opportunistic possibilities
derived merely from the existence of structural constraints on dispersed seniors' freedom to assess
and choose proposed amendments or mergers or recapitalizations, ,see, e.g., Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), afrd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944), a requirement
of complete disclosure upon issuing senior securities and full description of relative consequences
upon soliciting consent may be sufficient if coupled with a fairness requirement. CI HARPER El'
At.., supra note 80; Ian Ayers & Robert Gartner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE 14 87 (1989); Ian Ayers & Ruben' Gartner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE 1,1. 729 (1992).
Judicial interpretation to fill gaps or resolve ambiguities in public seniors' contracts might
seek light on the meaning of good Until in the solutimMi fur c omparable problems that appear
in private seniors' contracts. Cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHE', ,supra note 66, at 34. The absence of
protective provisions in the former's contracts that are present in the latter's is more likely to be
a function of structural defects than of conscious choice in the contracting process. Possibly, in
deference to the bargaining disadvantages of public senior investors (compared to private sen-
iors), good faith might require the issuer to inform public seniors of protective covenants in
private contracts that are "traded ofr in the public seniors' contract. In any event, the burden
of overcoming the failure of the public senior contract to authorize opportunistic behavior,
whether or not prohibited in private senior contracts, might be put upon the debtor—e.g. to
show that the common stockholders' alleged opportunism is consistent with the core terms of
the arrangement—rather than on the seniors to show that it is inconsistent.
For example, institutional investors who (alone or as a group) buy the bulk of a bond
issue directly from the debtor may appropriately be treated as a sole negotiating lender. See, e.g„
Metropolitan, 716 F. Supp. at 1514. But individuals or institutions who buy bonds on the market
or from underwriters are in a significantly different position with respect to the bargain in the
bond contract. They require—but generally do not have—the infbrination on the opportunistic
possibilities against which the sole lender protects but the bonds they buy may riot protect. When
they buy from the institutions that bought the issue from the debtor for investment, or in private
placements, the bonds may not contain covenants, because they were thought to be investment
grade or otherwise. See id.; Eastman & Viswanath, supra note 123. Public investors should be
infOrmed of the trade-offs embodied in those debt contracts—by either the issuer or the institu-
tional reseller. The absence of the requisite communication obscures the differences between the
bargaining capacity of a single aeo n on one side of the contract and a dispersed aggregate on
the other—differences that are relevant in parsing the notions of "autonomy" and "choice" in
interpreting "unconsciunability" or "good faith." See supra notes 101, 159.
t[17 Such systematic interpretive protection does not erode the market function of boilerplate,
as 'night be true if interpretation focuses on the intent of particular parties to a particular
transaction. Cf. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d
Cir. 1982).
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power to authorize departure from them. The former focuses on a
party's entitlement to benefit himself, and the limits of that entitle-
ment. The latter addresses the obligation of the fiduciary to serve the
beneficiary, and the resulting disability from benefiting himself except
as specified expressly. Courts, aided by commentators, have substan-
tially diluted fiduciary obligations of corporate management and of
controlling common stockholders in self-serving behavior vis-a-vis other
common stockholders—both the conduct proscribed and the quality
of the consent required to waive those proscriptions. Nevertheless, the
restraints that corporate fiduciary obligations impose retain enough
color of traditional fiduciary loyalty restrictions to distinguish them
from those imposed by contract doctrine—except possibly as notions
in contract doctrine like the requirements of good faith and uncon-
scionability may expand restrictions on opportunism by contracting
parties. The wealth-maximizing normative justifications for thus loos-
ening traditional fiduciary restrictions do not offer a convincing case
for overturning their teaching—at least in the absence of empirical
evidence that has thus far not been shown; and less utilitarian policy
considerations suggest retaining their teaching.
In contrast to the claim for fiduciary relationship and obligations
from management and controllers to public common stockholders is
the claim for such a relationship and obligations from the common
stockholders to senior security holders, like holders of bonds or pre-
ferred stock. The conflict of functions and interests between commons
and seniors are at the core of the relationship and demand restraints.
But considerations of efficiency preclude, and considerations of equity
do not require, traditional fiduciary restrictions on the former. The
economic and functional relationships of the parties fit more appro-
priately as a concept of contract, albeit one which finds limits on
opportunistic behavior by the common stock in contract-based notions
of duress, good faith and unconscionability.
Those limits may appropriately be determined by reference to
the levels of volition and cognition on which common stock, acting
through its management, would deal with sole lenders or sole holders
of preferred stock. Those levels may be approximated by placing on
the corporation (i.e. common stock) the burden of establishing—by
way of ex ante disclosure or otherwise—that its challenged conduct
does not erode or detract from the core values provided for the seniors
in the investment contract. Moreover, the structural obstacles to bring-
ing information disparities and constraints on free choice that afflict
public senior investors close enough to the level of sole lenders' trans-
actions implicate a need for an overriding cap of substantive fairness
on such dealings. To attempt thus to infuse into the content of the
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contracts to which public seniors ambiguously "consent" some of the
protection obtained by private seniors who actually consent is not to
invoke fiduciary considerations or to import hypothetical actors' aspi-
rations.
Much current scholarship envisions the corporate framework as
involving not only the competing interests of investors but also those
of stakeholders other than investors.'"" The latter vision of the corpo-
rate framework raises questions about the appropriate procedure for
making, as well as the substance of, decisions in response to those
competing interests. Those questions implicate issues of policy and
doctrine that are deeper and broader than any raised in this article.
Resolution of those issues invites a wholly "new paradigm" 1" and con-
siderable structural change in the corporate governance apparatus.
Little help in that process is likely to be offered by analysis or deline-
ation of decision-makers' duties in "fiduciary" termsrn or of the judicial
power to mold the "contract" concept or of differences between the
functions and consequences of the two constructs.
w Many of the problems addressed in this paper also arise in effiwts to determine what.
restraints, if any, should be imposed upon commons' or management's opportunistic behavior
toward investors in other kinds of securities. Differences among the roles or functions of those
securities in the capital structure may appropriately invite different doctrinal proscriptions of
opportunistic behavior. Thus, protection of holders of convertible securities or options may not
implicate fiduciary considerations any inure than is appropriate for protecting holders of straight
seniors. See, e.g., Bratton, Convertible Bonds. supra note 122; Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships,
supra note 122. Fiduciary notions may be even less appropriate to protect holders of complex
derivatives against opportunism by corporate decision-makers. But see, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, New
Financial Products: The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Puzzle of Shareholder
Welfare, 69 TEXAS L. 12f.v. 1273 (1991); Henry 'r.c. Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in
Gnporate Investment, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rini. 277 (1990). Conflicts between holders of different. classes
of common stock, such as dual class voting stock or tracking stock, may well involve contractual,
more than fiduciary, considerations, bin leave room for the latter, See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Hass,
Directorial Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stork Equity Stricture: The Need for a Duty o Fairness, 94
Mien. L. REV. 2089 (1966); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Competence:
Lesions From K-Mart, 74 N.C. L. Rcv. 1037, 1051-54 (1996); cf. Honigman v. Green Giant Co.,
309 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1962).
See .supra note 13.
170
 See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working ?'coward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CouPottATE
Law 35 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995); Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of
Corporate Board of Directors, 221 OF CORP. I.,. I (1996); see also supra note 13.
171 Except possibly with respect to their fidelity to the principals who select them.
